HAROLD LITTLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1986-08-11
No. BL-144
WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
492 So. 2d 807 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Harold Little appeals the denial of his motion to vacate sentence for writing a worthless check, claiming his guilty plea was induced by a plea bargain that was not honored. The court affirmed, holding that judges are not bound by prosecutorial sentencing recommendations and Little's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.


Holding

The trial court properly accepted Little's guilty plea, and judges are not bound by prosecutorial sentencing recommendations. Little's conviction is affirmed because the trial court made the necessary inquiry that the plea was freely, knowingly, and voluntarily given with full knowledge of consequences, and Little made no attempt to withdraw his plea.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must determine that a defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea before accepting a guilty plea.

[2] A judge is not bound by sentencing recommendations or negotiations that occur solely between the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel.

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Key Quotes

“Before a plea of guilty may be accepted, the trial court must determine, among other things, that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.”

Establishes the constitutional requirement for valid guilty pleas

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Facts & Procedural History

Little was charged with writing a worthless check and pleaded guilty after discussing the case with his attorney, assuring his attorney he had no prio…

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Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Judge.

MILLS, Judge.

Appellant Harold Little appeals pro se from an order denying his Rule 3.850, Fla. R.Crim.P., motion to vacate sentence. We affirm.

Appellant was charged by information with writing a worthless check. After discussing the merits of his case with his attorney, he decided to plead guilty in hopes of receiving a probationary sentence. His attorney made this recommendation based on Little’s assurance that he had not been convicted of any prior felonies and that he was not currently on probation. The State Attorney’s Office, also relying on this information, agreed to nolle prosequi a second charge and to recommend probation in this case if Little would plead guilty.

Little’s plea of guilty was accepted by the trial judge after he was satisfied that Little had freely, knowingly and voluntarily given the plea with full knowledge that the maximum sentence could be five years. However, he withheld sentencing pending the results of a presentence investigation.

The presentence investigation uncovered the fact that Little had been charged on numerous occasions with writing a worthless check and had been convicted on five of those counts. He was currently serving probation on four of those counts when the instant offense occurred. Based on this information, the trial judge chose to sen tence Little to four and one-half years imprisonment. Little made no attempt to withdraw his plea.

Before a plea of guilty may be accepted, the trial court must determine, among other things, that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea. Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1975). We find that prior to accepting Little’s plea, the trial judge made the necessary inquiry into whether the guilty plea was freely, knowingly and voluntarily given with full knowledge of the possible consequences. We are satisfied with his findings.

Appellant now seeks to enforce the original agreement between himself and the State, claiming that his guilty plea was induced by a plea bargain and that he was denied due process when that plea bargain was not kept. However, it is well settled that a judge is never bound in sentencing by negotiations which occurred between the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel. Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla.1975). Similarly, the trial court is under no duty to provide the defendant with a clear opportunity to withdraw his plea at sentencing where there is no suggestion that the trial court promised the sentence recommended by the State, or that the trial court was a party to the plea negotiations, and there was no assertion that the trial court refused a request by the defendant to withdraw his plea or that such request was ever made. Lepper v. State, 451 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Accordingly, appellant’s conviction will be affirmed.

WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mantle v. State, 592 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …reed to sentence. See State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1977); Green v. State, 580 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); [*1193] Johnson v. State, 541 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Stewart v. State, 511 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Little v. State, 492 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Lepper v. State, 451 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, if the record reveals a reasonable basis to conclude that a defendant was misled by a statement at the plea hearing made by the judge or by one or both of the attorn…
  • Reynolds v. State, 598 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …requirement of restitution, following the 10 years’ incarceration. The defense did not object to the imposition of a 5-year probationary term, nor did appellant move to withdraw his plea after the actual sentence was pronounced. See Little v. State, 492 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Lepper v. State, 451 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). As to the length of the probationary sentence, we hold that the issue is not cognizable on direct appeal. Murray v. State, 566 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Hadden v. State,…
  • Green v. State, 580 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …3). Further, the trial court was under no duty to honor the plea agreement or provide appellant with an opportunity to withdraw his plea because nothing in the record suggests that the trial court was party to the plea negotiations. Little v. State, 492 So. 2d 807, 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Moreover, the record reflects that the trial court did not give appellant any [*323] reason to believe that it would honor the plea agreement between the parties. Appellant’s third contention is that the trial court erred…

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