TYRONE OLIVER CHONG, PETITIONER,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, RESPONDENT
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The Board of Immigration Appeals correctly held that the petitioner was "convicted" under federal immigration law despite Florida's withholding of adjudication of guilt.
Petitioner was found with marijuana upon reentry to the U.S. and received probation in Florida with adjudication of guilt withheld. The BIA determined…
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PER CURIAM:
While on permanent resident status in the United States, the petitioner, Tyrone Oliver Chong, left the country. Upon his reentry, Customs agents discovered three pounds of marijuana concealed in his belongings. The state of Florida prosecuted Chong in its courts. Pursuant to Florida Statute 948.01(3), the state court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence, but placed Chong on probation for six months.
The issue is: whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) correctly held that Chong had been “convicted” within the meaning of the immigration laws of the United States. Conviction of a felony is a ground for deportation.
The BIA properly held that the petitioner was “convicted” within the meaning of section 241(a)(ll) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(ll), although the state court or dered that the adjudication of the petitioner’s guilt be withheld. The petitioner clearly meets the standards set forth by the BIA in Matter of Ozkok, Interim Decision 3044 (BIA 1988), and thus has been “convicted” for immigration purposes. The BIA was also correct in not considering the Florida expungement statute because this court, other courts of appeals, and the BIA have expressly held that the term “convicted” in the Act must be interpreted in accordance with federal standards. Gonzalez de Lara v. United States, 439 F. 2d 1316 (5th Cir.1971).
AFFIRMED.
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Geilher Molina v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992)…law precedent suggesting the contrary); see also Yazdchi v. INS, 878 F. 2d 166, 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978, 110 S.Ct. 505, 107 L.Ed.2d 507 (1989) (definition of the word “conviction” primarily a matter of federal law); Chong v. INS, 890 F. 2d 284, 285 (11th Cir.1989) (same); Kolios v. INS, 532 F. 2d 786, 789 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 884, 97 S.Ct. 234, 50 L.Ed.2d 165 (1976); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F. 2d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 776, 46 L.…
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Yanez-Popp v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 998 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993)…), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 776, 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976); Will v. INS, 447 F. 2d 529, 531 (7th Cir.1971); Gutierrez v. INS, 323 F. 2d 593, 596 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 1171, 12 L.Ed.2d 179 (1964); Chong v. INS, 890 F. 2d 284, 285 (11th Cir.1989) (same). Moreover, the Board has discretion to reinterpret the INA if it employs a “reasoned analysis.” Rust v. Sullivan, — U.S.-, -, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1769, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (“[a]n initial agency interpretation is not insta…
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United States v. Samaei, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2003)…in state court is of no import, for he did not do so, and unfortunately, the Court cannot consider something that never happened. 10 . An "adjudication withheld" is considered a conviction for purposes of immigration law. Chong v. INS, 890 F.2d 284, 284-85(11th Cir. 1989). 11 . In light of the Court’s decision on Count I, the Court need not reach Count II, regarding naturalization procured by concealment of material fact or by willful misrepresentation. 12 . INA § 340(a) provid…
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