JONATHAN NATE KIRK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kirk was convicted of burglary based on a confession obtained after police stopped him while riding his bicycle late at night in a residential neighborhood. The court reversed his conviction, holding that the police lacked the constitutionally required well-founded suspicion to initiate the stop.
The court held that police did not have well-founded suspicion to stop Kirk. The defendant's actions—riding a bicycle late at night in a high-crime area—were insufficient to establish more than bare suspicion of illegal activity, which is constitutionally impermissible under Florida law.
[1] A police stop of an individual requires a well-founded suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
[2] Police may not stop an individual based solely on the fact that the area is a high crime area.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida's Stop and Frisk law requires that the police have a well-founded suspicion that an individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.”
Establishes the constitutional standard police must meet to conduct a lawful stop
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKirk was riding his bicycle through a residential neighborhood shortly after midnight. He did not speed up or change direction when passing a police c…
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PER CURIAM.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the police had a sufficiently well-founded suspicion to stop the defendant for questioning.
The defendant was stopped by the police as he rode his bicycle through a residential neighborhood shortly after midnight. The defendant passed by a police cruiser but, according to testimony of the officers, did not speed up or change direction at the sight of the cruiser. There were no recent reports of crimes being committed in that area and no unusual circumstances were reported by the police officers who testified at the hearing. According to the officers, the defendant was stopped merely because the area he was riding in was a high crime area, the Auburndale Police Department has a policy to stop and identify persons on the street late at night and the bicycle had no reflectors or lights. After questioning by the police, the defendant confessed to the burglary of a restaurant earlier that evening.
We reverse the conviction on the authority of Mullins v. State, 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113. Florida’s Stop and Frisk law requires that the police have a well-founded suspicion that an individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The police may not stop an individual arbitrarily or on a bare or mere suspicion of illegal activity. Mullins, supra. The actions of the defendant were not sufficient to give rise to anything more than a bare suspicion of illegal activity. Thus the evidence seized and the statements of the defendant which resulted in his conviction must be suppressed and the judgment of the trial court reversed.
We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GRIMES, A.C.J., FRANK, J., and PATTERSON, DAVID F., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hill v. State, 561 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…e had his suspicion aroused but that did not rise to the level of a founded suspicion which justified a temporary detention. Rather, mere suspicion is no better than guesswork or a hunch and has no objective justification. Id. at 827; Kirk v. State, 493 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (illegal stop where police had policy to stop and identify persons on the street late at night, and appellant was riding bicycle without reflectors or lights in high crime area); R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA…
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Harris v. State, 574 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…frisked, and the juvenile and appellant were then both directed to empty their pockets. Appellant relies on cases such as Mullins v. State, 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979), Kirk v. State, 493 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), Levin v. State, 449 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), approved in State v. Levin, 452 So. 2d 562 (Fla.1984), and Lewis v. State, 382 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), in arguing that the initial stop was constitutionally impermissibl…
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State v. Banfield, 614 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…ts on the bicycles. Stephens also testified that it was his practice to issue such equipment citations. Under these circumstances, the stop was [*553] not pretextual. Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988). Although this court in Kirk v. State, 493 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) held that the act of riding a bicycle at night without lights in a high crime area is insufficient to justify a stop, we conclude that Kirk is distinguishable from the instant case. In Kirk, there was no evidence that the defendan…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mullins v. State, 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1978)
- Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court of Cal., 444 U.S. 883 (U.S. 1979)
- Pate v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 883 (U.S. 1979)
- Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)