MONROE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM, AS CHAIRMAN FOR THE RESPONDENT STATE OF FLORIDA ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION AND FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION; THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION; THE FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION; AND STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, APPELLEES
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Monroe County appealed a trial court order transferring its lawsuit against the Governor and state agencies from Monroe County to Leon County. The court affirmed the transfer, holding that venue properly lies in Leon County where the state agencies maintain their principal headquarters, and that Monroe County failed to establish an exception to the state's venue privilege.
The court affirmed the transfer to Leon County, holding that venue in civil actions brought against the state or its agencies lies where the state or agency maintains its principal headquarters unless there is a waiver or exception to the venue privilege. Monroe County failed to establish any exception to the state's venue privilege.
[1] A governmental agency is generally entitled to be sued only in the county of its headquarters under the common law home venue privilege.
[2] The sword-wielder exception to the home venue privilege applies when a plaintiff seeks judicial protection from a real or imminent danger of invasion of constitutional ri…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that venue in civil actions brought against the state or its agencies lies where the state or agency maintains its principle headquarters, unless there is a waiver or exception to the venue privilege.”
Establishes the foundational rule governing venue for suits against the state
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMonroe County filed suit challenging Chapter 27F-8 of the Florida Administrative Code, which consists of amended rules adopted by the Florida Administ…
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PER CURIAM.
Monroe County, the plaintiff below, seeks review of an order transferring the cause to Leon County. The trial judge based his ruling upon the following findings:
1. The Defendants, being Governor Bob Graham, and agencies of the State of Florida, are all located or headquartered in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. It is well established that venue in civil actions brought against the state or its agencies lies where the state or agency maintains its principle headquarters, unless there is a waiver or exception to the venue privilege. Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla 1977); Graham v. Edwards 472 So. 2d 803 (Fla 3rd DCA 1985).
2. Plaintiff Monroe County’s Complaint shows that this suit involves a challenge to, and an attempt to invalidate, Chapter 27F-8, Florida Administrative Code, consisting of amended rules adopted by the Defendant Florida Administration Commission that are presumptively applicable within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern, designated pursuant to Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes (1985).
3. The challenged rule amendments have been adopted and in effect since July, 1984. Furthermore, there is no Plaintiff who alleges that his personal property rights have been invaded or di rectly affected by the application of said Administration Commission Rules. Under these circumstances, the “sword wielder doctrine” relied upon by Plaintiff is not applicable, as there is no actual or threatened invasion of rights by the state, and Plaintiff’s suit is not in the nature of a shield against the state’s thrust. No exception to, or waiver of, the state’s venue privilege is present.
We fully agree with the determination below. See Florida Public Service Commission v. Triple “A” Enterprises, 387 So. 2d 940 (Fla.1980).
Affirmed.
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Citator
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Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. ST. John Med. Plans, Inc., 674 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…action into something more. For that reason, we conclude that the home venue privilege survives in favor of the state agency. The agency was not a “sword-wielder” under the substance of the allegations of the complaint. See Monroe County v. Graham, 493 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding “sword wielder exception not applicable as there was no actual or threatened invasion of rights by the state, and plaintiffs suit was not in the nature of a shield against the state’s thrust”). Likewise, the agency ca…
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Fla. Dep't of Ins. v. Amador, 841 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…state agency of home venue privilege). Amador’s suit against the Department is not “in the nature of a shield against the state’s thrust,” as no constitutionally guaranteed right or property interest was infringed upon. See Monroe County v. Graham, 493 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). There is no constitutional right in Florida to have one’s attorney’s fees paid. Furthermore, Amador is not entitled by statute to have his fees paid under § 111.07, Florida Statutes 1, as individual application of § 111.07 is…
Authorities Cited
- Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n of the State of Fla., 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1977)
- Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1980)
- Graham v. Edwards, 472 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)