RAMON NORTHCUT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ramon Northcut challenges his sentencing scoresheet, which awarded points for victim injury based on a battery conviction for slapping his girlfriend. The court held that victim injury points cannot be awarded under Florida sentencing guidelines for a battery charge involving mere touching without physical trauma.
Victim injury points may not be scored for battery under Fla. Stat. 784.03(1)(a) when the battery is charged as mere touching without evidence of physical trauma, because victim injury is to be scored only when it is an element of the offense at conviction and is limited to physical trauma.
[1] Victim injury points for sentencing guidelines may not be scored if the offense of conviction does not include physical trauma as an element.
[2] A battery conviction based solely on actual and intentional touching or striking, without causing bodily harm, does not inherently include physical trauma as an element f…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the guideline scoresheet should score victim injury "if it is an element of any offenses at conviction."”
Establishes the rule that victim injury points require injury to be an element of the offense of conviction
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant and his young girlfriend had a dispute during which he slapped her face several times. The girlfriend testified she was afraid and it hurt, …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Improper Exhibition Of A Dangerous Weapon cases and more on FLexlaw
[*86] DOWNEY, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of 1) manslaughter with a firearm, 2) improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon, 3) assault and 4) battery. The trial court sentenced appellant to time served on the misdemean-or convictions listed in 2, 3 and 4 above, and twelve years’ incarceration followed by five years’ probation on the manslaughter conviction. The latter sentence was predicated upon a scoresheet objected to by appellant. The only objection raised on this appeal has to do with ascribing seven points for “victim injury” resulting from the battery.
With regard to the battery count, the information charged that appellant “on the 14th day of June A.D. 1985, in the County and State aforesaid, did then and there commit a battery upon Janice Brown by actually and intentionally touching or striking her, against the will of said Janice Brown, contrary to F.S. 784.03(1).” The statute allegedly violated provides:
784.03 Battery.—
(1) A person commits battery if he:
(a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual.
(2) Whoever commits battery shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.-082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
It is apparent that appellant was charged with a battery under (l)(a) by mere touching or striking, not under (l)(b) with causing bodily harm.
The evidence adduced at trial indicated that appellant and his young girlfriend had gotten into “a fuss,” as a result of which appellant slapped her face several times, according to her “between hard or soft.” She testified she was afraid and that it hurt, but she did not recount any resulting injury. A witness testified that appellant had slapped her hard in the face and that she had cried.
At the time of sentencing, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(7) provided that the guideline scoresheet should score victim injury “if it is an element of any offenses at conviction.” The Committee Note provided under said rule instructs that:
(d)(7) This provision implements the intention of the commission that points for victim injury be added only when the defendant is convicted of an offense (scored as either primary of (sic) additional offense) which includes physical impact or contact. Victim injury is to be scored for each victim for whom the defendant is convicted of injuring and is limited to physical trauma. Victim injury shall be scored additionally for each count where victim injury is an element of each offense at conviction in excess of one count as to each victim.
Trauma is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as:
In medical jurisprudence. A wound; any injury to the body caused by external violence.
In view of the type of battery charged in the information, the limited evidence adduced (none of which showed any physical trauma as defined above), the rule limiting victim injury for scoring purposes only if such injury is an element of an offense, and the committee note limiting it to physical trauma, we hold that scoring points for victim injury based on the battery charge was error. Accordingly, the sentence is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to resentence appellant in accordance with the sentencing guidelines as interpreted in this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions.
GLICKSTEIN, J., and WETHERING-TON, GERALD T., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jackson v. State, 533 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…in assessing points for victim injury.1 Because victim injury is not an element of the offense, the trial court should not have assessed points for victim injury.2 We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See Northcut v. State, 493 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Teehan v. State, 488 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also Larkins v. State, 476 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). VACATED AND REMANDED. . He does not contest points assessed for victim injury for the aggravated battery co…
-
Kleparek v. State, 634 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…d pressed to say what the earlier legislature intended. Second, the record is void of “physical trauma” as that term is discussed and required by Karchesky. This court has determined that a “resulting injury” is required. [*1149] Northcut v. State, 493 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). For example, in Northcut, this court held that there was no physical trauma where the defendant slapped his girlfriend hard in the face several times, but there was no “resulting injury.” Id. at 86. Contrast Patchin v. State…
-
State v. Wadley, 514 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…) — malicious punishment. It is his contention that victim injury should not be scored because one can maliciously punish a child without actually physically injuring the child. He cites various cases in support of his contention. Northcut v. State, 493 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Holloman v. State, 482 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) [other cases omitted]. A later case from the Fourth District Court of Appeal also holds it to be error to score victim injury in a case like this. In fact the case is just li…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence