STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH RUSSO, LELAND CURRY, JAMES THOMAS CURRY, MARVIN CARLSEN AND ROLAND CARICOFE, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1986-08-20
No. 85-1694
DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and DELL, JJ., concur.
493 So. 2d 504 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 17 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appealed the dismissal of a RICO indictment charging five defendants with trafficking in cannabis and conspiracy to traffic. The court affirmed dismissal, holding that the indictment failed to allege two separate incidents of racketeering conduct as required by Florida's RICO statute, distinguishing Florida law from federal RICO which requires only two predicate acts.


Holding

The indictment was properly dismissed because it failed to allege two separate incidents of racketeering conduct. Although federal RICO allows prosecution for a substantive offense and conspiracy to commit that offense as two predicate acts, Florida's RICO statute requires 'two incidents' rather than 'two predicate acts,' reflecting legislative intent to narrow the statute's application to career criminals.


Headnotes

[1] A "pattern of racketeering activity" under Florida RICO requires at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that are interrelated and not isolated.

[2] The Florida RICO statute's requirement of "two incidents" of racketeering conduct is a narrower standard than the federal RICO statute's requirement of "two predicate act…

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Key Quotes

“"Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents”

Statutory definition establishing the requirement for two incidents of racketeering conduct under Florida RICO

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Facts & Procedural History

Five defendants were indicted under Florida's RICO statute for trafficking in cannabis and conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. The indictment charged o…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

•This is an appeal from an order dismissing Count I of the indictment of five defendants which charged them with violating the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), Section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The indictment charged the defendants with the substantive offense of trafficking in cannabis and conspiracy to so traffic. The trial court ruled that the indictment was legally insufficient because it charged the defendants with the commission of only one offense whereas section 895.02(4) requires “two incidents” of racketeering conduct. That section provides:

“Pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have' the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.

The main issue on appeal is whether the indictment, which charged the defendants with the act of trafficking in cannabis and the conspiracy to so traffic, satisfied the requirement that there be “two incidents” or predicate acts of racketeering conduct.

The state argues that the trial court erred in determining that the offenses constituted only one incident and asserts that acts which are part of the same transaction can still qualify as distinct incidents if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. The state refers to federal case law which allows for prosecution under federal RICO if the state charges the defendant with any of the substantive offenses included within the definition of racketeering and also charges the defendant with conspiracy to commit that offense.

While the Florida RICO statute is similar to the federal RICO statute it contains one important difference. Florida RICO refers to “two incidents” of racketeering conduct whereas federal RICO requires “two predicate acts.” We believe that the legislature intended to narrow the application of the Florida RICO statute by this language. This interpretation is in line with the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that the proper target of RICO prosecutions will be the career criminal. See Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.1981). Thus, we affirm the dismissal of the defective indictment.

DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and DELL, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Lucas, 600 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1992)
    …e federal act. Thus, it has been held that unlike cases brought under the federal act, crimes committed at the same time cannot [*1096] qualify as separate incidents for purposes of proving racketeering conduct under the Florida act. State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987). However, in this case the seventeen allegations of fraudulent activity were directed toward different persons, and there is no suggestion that they occurred at the same time. We hold tha…
  • Kanisky Evans v. State, 985 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
    …-one) and theft (count twenty-two). Because those two offenses arose out of the same transaction, they do not satisfy the “two incidents” requirement of the Florida RICO Act. Watts v. State, 558 So. 2d 142, 143-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). It follows that the conviction on count one must be vacated and that count will be included in the new trial previously ordered. We reject the defendant’s argument that convictions on counts twenty-one and twenty-two, the subs…
  • Shimek v. State, 610 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …e and LaCoste transactions as one “incident” within the meaning of the statute, there was a sufficient relationship between, those transactions and the Skipper transaction to satisfy the statutory requirement of two incidents. Lucas; State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA1986), rev. denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the RICO offense. III. Appellant’s next two points contend that the trial court erroneo…

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