C-SAND COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE
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C-Sand Company challenges the Department of Transportation's revocation of its outdoor advertising sign permit. The court reversed the revocation, holding that DOT's reconsideration of whether a nearby business was agricultural rather than commercial did not constitute an affirmative violation of the relevant statute sufficient to justify permit revocation.
The court reversed the revocation order, holding that section 479.08 requires an 'affirmative violation' of statutory provisions for permit revocation. The mere fact that DOT reconsidered its prior position regarding the nature of the business activity does not constitute such an affirmative violation, and therefore does not authorize revocation of the permit.
[1] A permit revocation under a statute allowing revocation for "violation of any of the provisions of this chapter" requires an affirmative violation, not merely compliance…
[2] An administrative agency's reconsideration of the nature of a business activity, leading to a change in its interpretation of permit requirements, does not constitute an…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 479.08, Florida Statutes, provides for permit revocation when 'the permittee has violated any of the provisions of this chapter,' in Wainwright this language was construed as requiring an 'affirmative violation' beyond mere compliance with a prior position from which DOT subsequently recedes.”
Establishes the legal standard for permit revocation under section 479.08, requiring an affirmative violation rather than mere reconsideration of prior agency positions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceC-Sand Company obtained an outdoor advertising sign permit in 1981 after DOT supervisors and inspectors confirmed the location was permittable, noting…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of an administrative order by which the Department of Transportation (DOT) revoked a permit for an outdoor advertising sign. We reverse the order appealed.
Appellant was issued an outdoor advertising sign permit in 1981. Prior to submitting the permit application appellant contacted a DOT district supervisor who advised that the location of appellant’s sign was. a permittable site. A DOT field inspector also viewed the location and recommended that the permit be issued, determining that the area was unzoned commercial and that the proposed location was within 800 feet of Imperial Nurseries, a commercial activity. A DOT administrator then inspected the proposed site and the application was approved.
In 1984 another DOT administrator inspected the site and determined that Imperial Nurseries is an agricultural, rather than a commercial, activity. DOT then issued a notice of violation indicating an intent to revoke the permit upon a determination that the location is “not zoned or un-zoned commercial or industrial....” An administrative hearing was held, and it was noted that DOT has no written guidelines as to what constitutes “agricultural” activity.
However, the DOT administrator suggested that an error had been made when appellant’s permit was originally issued, and testified that he applied the same criteria as were then in effect. The hearing officer entered a recommended order indicating that appellant’s application contained neither false nor misleading information, and that appellant did not violate any provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. It was thus recommended that appellant’s permit not be revoked.
However, DOT entered a final order concluding that appellant had “submitted an application for a site which was in violation of Chapter 479, F.S.” DOT therefore revoked appellant’s sign permit.
The factual circumstances of this case are similar to those presented in Wainwright v. State of Florida Department of Transportation, 488 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), a case which also involved a reconsideration of the nature of the business activity conducted at Imperial Nurseries. While section 479.08, Florida Statutes, provides for permit revocation when “the permittee has violated any of the provisions of this chapter,” in Wainwright this language was construed as requiring an “affirmative violation” beyond mere compliance with a prior position from which DOT subsequently recedes. See also, Food ’N Fun v. Department of Transportation, 493 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
As in Wainwright, in the present case such an affirmative violation has not been established, and section 479.08 thus does not authorize the revocation of appellant’s sign permit.
The order appealed is reversed..
MILLS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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T & L Mgmt., Inc. v. Dep't OF Transp., 497 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…change in policy does not provide DOT with the authority to revoke a permit pursuant to section 479.08. See Tri-State Systems, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 500 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); C-Sand Company v. Department of Transportation, 494 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Food ’N Fun, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 493 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Wainwright v. Department of Transportation, 488 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In the instant cases, however, where permits are issued in cle…
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Chipley Motel v. Dep't OF Transp., 498 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…rror or mistake in the application in respect to the zoning classification of the site. The plain language of section 479.08 requires an affirmative act by the permittee which violates the statute. See C-Sand Company v. Department of Transportation, 494 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Wainwright v. Department of Transportation, 488 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). At the time of Chipley’s erection of the sign, it conformed to the permit issued pursuant to the application prepared in accordance with DOT’s instr…
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Tri-State Sys., Inc. v. Dep't OF Transp., 497 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…S, Judge. This is another in a series of cases challenging the Department of Transportation’s revocation of outdoor advertising sign permits. This case is controlled by our earlier holdings in C-Sand Company [*684] v. Department of Transportation, 494 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), and Food N’ Fun v. Department of Transportation, 493 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We reverse on the authority of these decisions in that there was no evidence that the application for permit contained “knowingly false or misle…
Authorities Cited
- Wainwright v. State, 488 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Food 'N FUN, Inc. v. Dep't OF Transp., 493 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)