IN THE INTEREST OF Y.F.W., A MINOR CHILD
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This appeal challenges a permanent commitment order terminating parental rights of a father who failed to maintain a court-ordered live-in housekeeper. The court reversed the commitment because the initial petition failed to allege the statutory grounds of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, and allowing amendment at the close of the state's case did not cure this critical defect.
The court reversed the permanent commitment order because the petition's initial failure to allege statutory grounds for commitment is a critical defect that cannot be cured by amendment at the close of the state's case. Permanent termination of parental rights requires strict compliance with applicable statutes and rules, and amendment does not constitute implied consent to try a separate issue regarding existence of statutory grounds.
[1] A petition for permanent commitment of a child must allege facts sufficient to support the commitment, including statutory grounds for abuse, abandonment, or neglect, abs…
[2] A trial court may not enter a final judgment of permanent commitment based on a petition that fails to allege the statutory grounds of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court is authorized to commit permanently for future adoption a legally dependent child when it is manifestly in his best interest and when he has been abused, abandoned, or neglected.”
Establishes the statutory requirement that one of three specific grounds must exist for permanent commitment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA seven-year-old female child had been in foster care since 1982. In July 1984, the mother's parental rights were terminated, but the father was order…
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SMITH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of permanent commitment of a seven year old female child who has been in foster care since 1982. Because of the existence of a critical defect in the proceedings below, we are compelled to reverse. .
There have been three permanent commitment proceedings. On July 10, 1984, the court entered its final judgment of permanent commitment as to the mother and ordered continuing foster care as to the father. The court entered its second order on February 21, 1985, ordering the child to be returned to the father under the protective services supervision of HRS and requiring the father to maintain a live-in housekeeper who would be approved and monitored by HRS. We find it unnecessary to relate the factual circumstances which support the trial court’s finding that the assistance of a live-in housekeeper was critical to the father’s ability to care for the child. Be that as it may, before the child could be returned to the father, he lost his housekeeper. On November 20,1985, HRS filed its third permanent commitment petition alleging that the father had failed to maintain a live-in housekeeper. At the hearing, the trial court permitted HRS, at the close of its case, to amend the petition to include allegations of abandonment and neglect.
Appellant contends, among other things, that the trial court erred as a matter of law in entering an order of permanent commitment based on a petition filed by HRS which failed to allege abandonment, abuse, or neglect. We agree with appellant and reluctantly reverse the trial court’s final judgment.
A trial court is authorized to commit permanently for future adoption a legally dependent child when it is manifestly in his best interest and when he has been abused, abandoned, or neglected. § 39.-41(1)(f)(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). In the absence of parental consent to a permanent commitment, one of the above statutory grounds must be alleged and proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the Interest of R.W., et al., 495 So. 2d 133 (Fla.1986). Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.810(a) requires that a petition for permanent commitment “contain allegations of facts necessary to support such a commitment” and a prayer for relief.
The petition herein was defective in that it lacked the requisite statutory ground and allegations of facts in support thereof. Since the permanent termination of parental rights is a drastic step, applicable statutes and rules must be strictly followed. In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J., 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Under the circumstances of this case, amending the petition at the close of appel-lee’s case did not cure the defects in the pleading. The fact that evidence of abandonment or neglect may have been introduced on the issue of compliance with the permanent placement plan does not constitute implied consent to try a separate issue as to the existence of statutory abuse, abandonment, or neglect.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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Fredrick v. State, 523 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…ionally protected parental rights forfeited. See Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.810(a), which requires a petition for permanent commitment to “contain allegations of facts necessary to support such a commitment,” and In the Interest of Y.F.W., 494 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). As to paragraph 6 in the amended petition, an allegation that the mother allegedly failed to visit and support the child who was in foster care cannot support a finding of statutory neglect, section 39.-01(30), Florida Statutes…
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In the Interest of J.V. v. State, 516 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…ment. See § 39.41, Fla.Stat. Because of such potential sanctions, and the onus attached to such an adjudication, we conclude that the provisions of Chapter 39, relating to dependency, must be strictly construed. See, e.g., In the Interest of Y.F W., 494 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (petition lacking allegations of abandonment, abuse, or neglect insufficient, because applicable statutes and rules [*1135] must be strictly followed); In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J., 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. fo…
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M.A. v. Dept. OF Children AND Families, 814 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…at the father’s voluntary execution of a case plan waived the requirement that the children be adjudicated as to him. Statutes relating to dependency and termination of parental rights must be strictly followed. See, e.g., In the Interest of Y.F.W., 494 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J., 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 693 (Fla.1985). In addition, the signature page of the case plan that the father signed states, “Signing this document is NOT…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of R.W. v. Pollock, 495 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1986)
- In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J, 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)