WILSON GORDON, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE KENNETH M. LEFFLER, CIRCUIT JUDGE, EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Gordon petitioned for a writ of prohibition to be discharged from criminal prosecution for drug offenses, claiming the state violated speedy trial rules by failing to bring him to trial within the required timeframe. The court granted the writ, holding that the state failed to comply with speedy trial requirements under both the prior and revised rules, causing the trial court to lose jurisdiction.
The trial court lost jurisdiction to prosecute Gordon because the state failed to comply with speedy trial requirements. Under the prior rule, Gordon was not brought to trial within 180 days of arrest, and under the revised rule, the state failed to try him within 15 days of his motion for discharge filing.
[1] The date of a defendant's arrest triggers the running of the time periods under the speedy trial rule.
[2] A trial court's factual findings regarding the date of arrest are binding on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under applicable case law, the date of the arrest triggers the running of the time periods under the speedy trial rule within which a defendant must be brought to trial by the state, or be discharged from prosecution.”
Establishes the legal principle that arrest date determines when speedy trial protections begin
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGordon was arrested on December 5, 1984, for sale and possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion for discharge on July 3, 1986, which was…
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SHARP, Judge.
Gordon files a petition for writ of prohibition seeking discharge under the speedy trial rule1 from prosecution for criminal charges involving sale and possession of a controlled substance, which stem from his arrest on December 5, 1984. Based on the record before us, we issue the writ.
On December 5, 1984, law enforcement officials came to Gordon’s home to question him about the sale of a controlled substance. The transcript of the record made at Gordon’s hearing on his motion for discharge contains conflicting statements by the witnesses as to whether or not he was arrested for the sale and possession offenses that day. However, the trial court entered an order on July 14, 1986, which declared that Gordon had been arrested on December 5, 1984. He found:
This cause came on to. be' heard July 9, 1986, during which the court received testimony of the Defendant and the officers who arrested the Defendant Dec. 5, 1984 (Emphasis supplied).
We are bound by the trial court’s fact findings that an arrest occurred on December 5, 1984. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, Griffin v. Florida, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986), and Snow v. State, 399 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), where no arrest occurred.
Under applicable case law, the date of the arrest triggers the running of the time periods under the speedy trial rule within which a defendant must be brought to trial by the state, or be discharged from prosecution.2 Gordon filed a motion for discharge on July 3, 1986. A hearing was set on July 8, 1986, and the court reserved its ruling. Thereafter, the motion was denied on July 14, 1986, by the above quoted order. Gordon’s trial was then scheduled for July 22, 1986.
We need not decide in this case whether or not the revised speedy trial rule, effective January 1, 1985, or the prior speedy trial rule applies to this case, because the result under both is the same.3 Under the prior rule, Gordon was not brought to trial within 180 days following his arrest. His motion for discharge was filed after the 180 days had run. Under the revised rule, the state failed to bring him to trial within fifteen days after the date his motion for discharge was filed. Both rules mandate that the trial court lost jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for the offense for which he was arrested on December 5, 1984.4
Accordingly, we issue the writ of prohibition and order that petitioner be discharged.
WRIT ISSUED.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1).
. See State v. Brandt, 460 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1985); Bannister v. State, 382 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
. Cf. McKnight v. Bloom, 490 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); State v. Green, 473 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(i)(4).
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Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…cal arrest. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(d). Under rule 3.191, the date of the original arrest is the focal point for speedy trial considerations. Adams v. State, 659 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA), cause dismissed, 662 So. 2d 341 (Fla.1995); Gordon v. Leffler, 495 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So. 2d 327 (Fla.1987). A formal arrest, complete with fingerprinting and formal charges, is not always necessary to start the running of the speedy trial time. State v. Lail, 687 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); S…
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Lasker v. The Honorable James S. Parker & the Honorable John R. Blue, 513 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…termine whether the facts justified the defendant’s discharge. The rule was amended, however, to allow the state an opportunity to bring the defendant to trial within fifteen days of the date of filing of the motion for discharge. Gordon v. Leffler, 495 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So. 2d 327 (Fla.1987); but see Ricci v. Parker, No. 87-1954 (Fla. 2d DCA September 4, 1987) [12 F.L.W. 2143]. The rule in its present form provides that: No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a mo…
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Lenard v. The Honorable John Dean Moxley, Jr., 497 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…hin fifteen days following the filing of the motion. Thereupon, the trial court lost jurisdiction to prosecute Lenard for the crimes for which he was arrested on January 14, 1986: attempted murder and carrying a concealed firearm. Gordon v. Leffler, 495 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The state argues that the fifteen day “window” period in rule 3.191(i)(4)2 should not begin to run unless the defendant accompanied the motion with a notice of hearing setting the time for such hearing within five days. We find…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Green, 473 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- McKNIGHT v. The Honorable Philip Bloom, 490 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. Brandt, 460 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Snow v. State, 399 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Bannister v. State, 382 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)