CONSTANCE COON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Constance Coon appealed her conviction for trafficking in cocaine after the trial judge refused to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea. The court reversed, holding that because the trial judge failed to clearly explain the consequences of not fulfilling her plea bargain condition (testifying against a codefendant), she should have been permitted to withdraw her plea.
The trial judge erred in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea. Although the judge thoroughly explained her general rights and the potential sentence, he did not make clear the specific consequences that would result if she failed to testify against her codefendant as required by the plea agreement.
[1] A trial court should allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant was not made aware of the consequences of failing to fulfill the conditions of a plea…
[2] A guilty plea is involuntary when the trial court fails to clearly explain the consequences of breaching the plea agreement.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a fair reading of the colloquy at that hearing reveals that although the defendant was made aware of the consequences if she performed the condition of her plea bargain agreement by testifying against her code-fendant, the trial judge did not make clear to her the consequences if she did not so testify”
This establishes the court's primary reasoning for reversing—that the trial judge failed to explain what would happen if Coon violated the plea bargain by refusing to testify.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCoon entered into a plea bargain agreement where she would plead guilty to trafficking in cocaine and testify truthfully against a codefendant in exch…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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DANAHY, Chief Judge.
The defendant appeals her judgment and sentence for trafficking in cocaine, challenging the trial judge’s refusal to allow the defendant to withdraw her plea of guilty. We reverse.
The trial judge accepted the defendant’s plea of guilty at the conclusion of a hearing at which counsel for the defendant and counsel for the state outlined the terms of a plea bargain agreement. It was agreed that the defendant would testify truthfully against a codefendant in exchange for which the state would file a motion pursuant to the substantial assistance statute, section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes (1985), and the defendant would receive probation with the condition that she serve 364 days in jail.
When it came time to testify against her codefendant, the defendant refused to do so. Previously, she had filed a motion to withdraw her plea of guilty and that motion was denied. After her refusal to testify, she again requested that she be allowed to withdraw her plea and the trial judge again denied the request. Subsequently, she was sentenced to four and one-half years imprisonment with a three year mandatory minimum. We believe that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge should have allowed the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea.
The transcript of the plea bargain hearing reveals a very thorough examination of the defendant by the trial judge and a detailed explanation by him of the rights which she would relinquish by pleading guilty. The trial judge also recited more than once the maximum sentence for the crime of which the defendant was charged, and the mandatory minimum fine and period of incarceration. However, a fair reading of the colloquy at that hearing reveals that although the defendant was made aware of the consequences if she performed the condition of her plea bargain agreement by testifying against her code-fendant, the trial judge did not make clear to her the consequences if she did not so testify. Under such circumstances, we believe the trial judge should have permitted the defendant to withdraw her plea. Cf. Jackson v. State, 483 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (trial judge did not err in refusing to allow a defendant to withdraw her plea where the defendant had agreed that if her prior criminal record was not as she had represented, the court would not be bound by its promise to limit sentence and, further, she would not be allowed to withdraw her plea).
We reverse and remand with directions that the defendant be allowed to withdraw her plea of guilty.
SCHOONOVER and SANDERLIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Pettit v. State, 553 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…d the court to set aside his plea and proceed to trial. The court refused, sentencing Pet-tit in accordance with the sentencing guidelines. Pettit now argues that the court erroneously refused to allow him to withdraw his plea, citing Coon v. State, 495 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). As in the instant case, Coon agreed to testify against a codefendant in exchange for probation. However, unlike Pettit, Coon moved to withdraw her plea prior to her codefend-ant’s trial. We believe this distinction is critical. H…
Authorities Cited
- Jackson v. State, 483 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)