JOHN LEE WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Walker challenged a mistrial motion after the prosecutor referenced in opening statement that he had given police conflicting alibis. The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the mistrial motion, holding that evidence of false exculpatory statements is admissible as consciousness of guilt and that the defendant's own statements, not the prosecutor's opening reference, created any tactical burden.
The trial court properly denied the mistrial motion. Evidence of false exculpatory statements is admissible as substantive evidence of consciousness of guilt, and the defendant's own statements to police, not the state's opening reference, created any tactical burden on the defense.
[1] A party's opening statement is limited to facts intended in good faith to be substantiated by evidence in their case-in-chief.
[2] Evidence of a defendant's false statements regarding their whereabouts at the time of a crime is admissible as substantive evidence tending to show consciousness of guilt…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In his opening statement, a party is limited to a discussion of facts which he intends in good faith to substantiate by testimony or other evidence in his case-in-chief.”
Establishes the legal standard governing opening statements and the state's obligation to substantiate assertions made therein.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring opening statement, the state attorney mentioned that the defendant had told a police officer he was drinking with his sister and her boyfriend …
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial made when the state attorney, in opening statement to the jury, referred to the fact that the defendant had told a police officer that at the relevant time he was drinking with his sister and her boyfriend and that the defendant’s mother had sworn that at the same time the defendant was asleep at home. The defendant argues that this reference prejudiced his right to a fair trial because it forced him to call his sister and her boyfriend as alibi witnesses and violated his due process rights by shifting the burden to him to prove his innocence. We disagree and affirm.
In his opening statement, a party is limited to a discussion of facts which he intends in good faith to substantiate by testimony or other evidence in his case-in-chief. Juhasz v. Barton, 146 Fla. 484, 1 So. 2d 476 (1941); Spaziano v. State, 429 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Here, the evidence of defendant’s false statements came in when counsel for defendant was cross examining one of the state’s witnesses. If defendant had not brought this information out on cross examination, the state had the obligation to substantiate the assertion it had made in opening statement. Once counsel for defendant brought this fact out, however, the state was not required to offer further proof.
Evidence of a defendant’s acts or statements calculated to defeat or avoid prosecution is admissible against him as showing consciousness of guilt. Douglas v. State, 89 So. 2d 659 (Fla.1956); Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and cases collected therein. The state was entitled to present evidence that the defendant had lied about his whereabouts at the time of the crimes in question because such false exculpatory statements are admissible in the state’s case as substantive evidence tending to affirmatively show a consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 278 (Chadboume Rev.1979); 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 218 (13th Ed.1972).
In view of this admissible evidence, if the defendant felt he should call his sister and her boyfriend as alibi witnesses that was a decision for the defense to make. The defendant, not the state, caused himself this dilemma by making his statement to the police officer. AFFIRMED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., and SHARP and CO-WART, JJ., concur.
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Burkell v. State, 992 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…ss doors of the victim’s bedroom. Furthermore, the defendant’s statement to police that he believed the decedent hit his head in a drunken fall could be construed by the jury as a deliberate attempt to deceive the police. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 495 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that evidence that defendant had lied to police to defeat or avoid prosecution was admissible as showing consciousness of guilt). Finally, financial incentives, including defendant’s deposit of the victim’s $10,00…
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Simpson v. State, 562 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…he evidence.” Id. at 549-50. Assuming its voluntariness, appellant’s false statement would have been admissible in the State’s case as substantive evidence tending to affirmatively show a consciousness of guilt on appellant’s part. Walker v. State, 495 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). See also United States v. Holbert, 578 F. 2d 128 (5th Cir.1978) (false exculpatory statements may be used ... as substantive evidence tending to prove guilt.). However, as the court stated in Jackson v. State, 435 So. 2d 984, 98…
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Tarver v. State, 571 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ly admitted both in the State’s case in chief and for impeachment of defendant after defendant took the stand, under the controlling and indistinguishable authority of Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see also Walker v. State, 495 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that the reference to Ms. Lewis was within the permissible scope of the State’s cross-examination and did not constitute a comment upon a defendant’s failure to call witnesse…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mervin Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Spaziano v. State, 429 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Juhasz v. Barton, 146 Fla. 484 (Fla. 1941)
- Emmett v. State, 89 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1956)