SUNSHINE SECURITY & DETECTIVE AGENCY, APPELLANT,
v.
WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICES CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Sunshine Security appeals a default judgment entered against it in a lawsuit by Wells Fargo Armored Services. The appellate court reversed the default judgment, holding that the complaint wholly failed to state a cause of action against Sunshine because the alleged employee misconduct fell outside the scope of employment and thus could not be imputed to the employer under respondeat superior.
A default judgment cannot be entered against a defendant on a complaint that wholly fails to state a cause of action. Here, the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Sunshine because the employee's conspiracy to rob the bank was plainly outside the scope of his employment and therefore could not be imputed to the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
[1] A default judgment may not be entered against a defendant on a complaint that wholly fails to state a cause of action.
[2] An employee's tortious actions, such as conspiring to rob a location the employer was contracted to guard, are generally considered outside the scope of employment for pu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the law is well-settled that a default judgment may not be entered against a defendant on a complaint which wholly fails to state a cause of action against the said defendant”
Establishes the foundational principle that a default judgment requires a complaint that states a valid cause of action
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWells Fargo sued Sunshine Security, alleging that one of Sunshine's employees, while employed to guard a bank, conspired with third parties to rob Wel…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Sunshine Security and Detective Agency [Sunshine] from a final default judgment entered against it in the trial court. The defendant Sunshine urges that the trial court erred in entering the default judgment below because, inter alia, the original complaint, on which the default was based, wholly failed to state a cause of action against it. We entirely agree and reverse based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.
First, the law is well-settled that a default judgment may not be entered against a defendant on a complaint which wholly fails to state a cause of action against the said defendant. See North American Accident Insurance Co. v. Moreland, 60 Fla. 153, 53 So. 635 (1910); Fernandez-Aguirre v. Gall, 484 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Bay Products Corp. v. Winters, 341 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); GAC Corp. v. Beach, 308 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
Second, the operative complaint herein alleges that an employee of the defendant Sunshine, while on the job, conspired with certain third parties to rob employees of the plaintiff Wells Fargo who were making a cash pick-up at the bank which the defendant Sunshine was under contract to guard. The complaint then seeks to impute its employee’s conspiracy to Sunshine based on an agency theory. In our view, the employee’s tortious actions in so conspiring represent a classic case of an employee acting outside the scope of his employment. The subject employee was hired by the defendant Sunshine to guard the bank which he, in fact, conspired to rob. In this endeavor, we think the employee was plainly off on a frolic of his own, was in no way furthering the interests of his employer, and, consequently, was not acting within the scope of his employment as an agent of Sunshine under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Weiss v. Jacobson, 62 So. 2d 904 (Fla.1973); Johnson v. Gulf Life Insurance Co., 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Martin v. United Security Services, Inc., 373 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Reina v. Metropolitan Dade County, 285 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. discharged, 304 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1974). This being so, the original complaint wholly fails to state a cause of action against the defendant Sunshine, and, consequently, the default judgment herein was improperly entered below.
Third, the remaining reasons urged by the defendant Sunshine for setting aside the default judgment below have no merit and are specifically rejected. See Westerman v. Shell’s City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1972); Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Dowd Shipping, Inc. v. Lee, 354 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); see also Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1963) (disputes over validity of process resolved on basis of facts of each case).
The final default judgment under review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
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Morton L. Ginsberg & MLG Props., Inc. v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, 645 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…fails, on its face, to set forth a viable cause of action. See Becerra v. Equity Imports, 551 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Magnificent Twelve Inc. v. Walker, 522 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Sunshine Security & Detective Agency v. Wells Fargo, 496 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Fernandez-Aguirre v. Gall, 484 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). As this court explained in Becerra: A default admits liability as claimed in the pleading by the party seeking affirmative relief against the party in default. It o…
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Becerra v. Equity Imports, Inc., 551 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ted. Bayne v. Sun Fin. Co. No. 1, 114 Ga.App. 27, 150 S.E. 2d 311 (1966). A default judgment should be set aside where the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action. Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 496 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Brumby v. Clearwater, 108 Fla. 633, 149 So. 203 (Fla.1933); GAC Corp. v. Beach, 308 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Because the defect is apparent from the face of the complaint this court is not precluded from ordering relief fro…
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Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp. v. Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency, Inc., 575 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1991)…beyond the scope of his agency relationship with Sunshine Security. The Third District rejected all remaining grounds for reversal and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 496 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). After receiving the mandate, the trial court dismissed the original complaint on January 8, 1987. Subsequently, Wells Fargo filed an amended complaint and a motion to add new parties and theories of recovery. Sunshine Security t…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (17 total)
- Slomowitz v. E.O. Walker and Geneva Walker, 429 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1972)
- Sarron v. Barbel I. Sarron, 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Weiss v. Jacobson, 62 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1953)
- Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- BAY Prods. Corp. v. Winters, 341 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- The N. Am. Accident Ins. Co. v. Moreland, 60 Fla. 153 (Fla. 1910)
- GAC Corp. v. Beach, 308 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Reina v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 285 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)