IN THE INTEREST OF R.N.G., C.A.G., AND S.E.G., MINOR CHILDREN
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The trial court entered a final judgment of permanent commitment of three minor children. The natural parents filed a timely notice of appeal but had previously filed a motion for rehearing that remained undecided. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was premature under Florida law, and certified several important questions to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the proper treatment of notices of appeal filed before post-trial motions are decided.
The appellate court lacks jurisdiction because the notice of appeal is premature and remains 'in limbo' until the trial court rules on the pending motion for rehearing. The court directed the appellant to inform it within thirty days whether the trial court had ruled on the motion, and jurisdiction would vest only upon receipt of notice that the motion was denied.
[1] A notice of appeal filed before a pending motion for rehearing is ruled upon is premature and does not vest jurisdiction in the appellate court.
[2] An appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal when a timely motion for rehearing has not been ruled upon by the trial court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the record indicates that the motion for rehearing has not been ruled upon, it appears that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and that the notice of appeal remains 'in limbo' until the trial court effectuates rendition by ruling on the motion for rehearing”
The court's primary holding that jurisdiction is suspended when a notice of appeal is filed before a pending post-trial motion is decided
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 10, 1986, the trial court entered a final judgment of permanent commitment concerning three minor children (R.N.G., C.A.G., and S.E.G.). The …
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SHIVERS, Judge.
On March 10, 1986, the trial court entered a final judgment of permanent commitment and on April 9, 1986, the natural parents filed a timely notice of appeal. Pri-or to filing the notice of appeal, however, the parents filed a timely motion for rehearing. Since the record indicates that the motion for rehearing has not been ruled upon, it appears that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and that the notice of appeal remains “in limbo” until the trial court effectuates rendition by ruling on the motion for rehearing. Lloyd v. Harrison, 489 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) and Leopard v. State, 489 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
We therefore direct the appellant to inform this court within thirty (30) days whether the trial court has ruled on the motion for rehearing and to supplement the record on appeal with any such ruling. In the event this court receives notice that the trial court has denied the motion, the notice of appeal will mature and jurisdiction will vest in this court.
We certify to the Florida Supreme Court the same questions as were certified in the Lloyd and Leopard cases, as matters of great public importance: 1. Are the appellate courts of this state bound by what appears to be dictum in Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74, 79-80 (Fla.1975), to the effect that notices of appeal filed after written judgment is filed for recording, but before a post-trial motion is decided, are premature, but may riot be dismissed on that ground?
2. If so, does the Williams rule apply even in the case where the post-trial motion was filed by the appellant, or may the appellate court treat such motions as having been abandoned by the action of filing the notice of appeal, Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1949)?
3. If the Williams rule would apply in such situations, are the appellate courts required to search the record in each case for evidence that such a post-trial motion has been filed and has not been ruled upon?
4. If the appellate court is required to search the record for undecided post-trial motions, do the parties have an obligation to bring such motions to the attention of the appellate court and/or to ensure that such motions are included in the record on appeal?
5. If the Williams rule places a notice of appeal in a state of “limbo” until the trial court rules upon the post-trial motion(s), may the appellate court limit the duration of this “limbo” by appropriate order, or is the “limbo” of possibly infinite duration?
6. If the appellate courts may not curtail the “limbo” in which the notices of appeal are placed in such circumstances, what procedure should be used to handle those case files until such time as the notices of appeal mature?
SMITH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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Nona Maynard v. Maynard, 515 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ling of notice of appeal prior to disposition of motion for rehearing constituted abandonment of motion for rehearing). . This result is consistent with Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975); In the Interest of R.N.G., C.A.G., and S.E.G., 496 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Leopard v. State, 489 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).…
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In re the Est. OF Louis Anthony Retzel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 586 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…the appeal is in “limbo” until disposition of the motion for rehearing on the merits by the trial court. [*1250] Lloyd v. Harrison, 489 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Leopard v. State, 489 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); In the Interest of R.N.G., 496 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The probate division’s order finding that the motion for rehearing was “moot” was not a ruling on the merits. As also above noted, a final ruling on the merits, in which the court denied the motion for rehearing, was not entered…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975)
- Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949)
- Lloyd v. Baya Harrison, 489 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Leopard v. State, 489 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)