EAST BAY RACEWAY AND K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
GEORGE E. PARHAM, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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A stock car raceway owner appeals a judgment awarding damages to a patron injured by an airborne vehicle that pole-vaulted over the track's wall and gate. The court reverses, finding insufficient evidence that the raceway's negligence caused the injury, as the plaintiff failed to establish how the gate construction could have prevented an airborne vehicle from striking him.
The court reversed the judgment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish negligence. The plaintiff failed to prove how the raceway's actions deviated from a reasonable standard of care or how the gate construction could have prevented an airborne vehicle from causing injury.
[1] A race track operator has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons.
[2] To establish a breach of duty by a race track operator, a patron must prove the operator had knowledge of a dangerous condition, that a reasonable operator would have exe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is indeed the duty of a race track operator to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons.”
Establishes the legal standard applicable to raceway operators.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring a race at appellant's premises, a car collided with another car, hit a guard rail, and pole-vaulted over the wall and gate, striking and injuri…
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HALL, Judge.
The owner of a stock car raceway appeals a final judgment which awarded damages to a patron who was injured by an airborne vehicle while he was standing in an area adjacent to the raceway waiting to cross the race track and enter the central oval pit area. We reverse on the merits of appellant’s arguments concerning proof of negligence and, therefore, deem it unnecessary to address appellant’s arguments regarding a release agreement signed by the patron prior to entering the area.
At trial appellee presented testimony that during a race on appellant’s premises, a car collided with another car, hit the guard rail, and suddenly “pole vaulted” over the wall and gate, striking and injuring appellee. Evidence was presented as to the soundness of the bottom portion of the gate which was reinforced by two steel I beams and a concrete retaining wall. Ap-pellee drew attention to the fact that the locking bar on the gate was roughly the size of a broomstick.
It is indeed the duty of a race track operator to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons. Harrel v. Martin, 345 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In order to establish a breach of that duty, appellee had the burden of proving that appellant had knowledge of a condition which caused the accident, that a reasonable race track owner would have exercised greater caution, and that there was a causal connection between the incident causing injury and a negligent act by appellant. Food Fair Stores v. Spinelli, 122 So. 2d 41 (Fla.2d DCA 1960). Negligence cannot be assumed by proving merely that an accident occurred. Abrams v. Nolan Brown Cadillac, 228 So. 2d 131 (Fla.3d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 536 (Fla.1970).
Appellee’s case insufficiently addressed exactly how appellant’s actions deviated from a reasonable standard of care, specifically, how the allegedly faulty construction of the wall could have caused injuries or how any type of gate could have prevented an airborne vehicle from injuring appellee.
In light of evidence presented and the requisite elements of negligence, it is clear that the jury verdict lacked a sufficient basis in law, and since there was not sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury, the trial court erred in not granting the motion for a directed verdict. The judgment is therefore reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the jury verdict and enter judgment for appellant.
LEHAN, A.C.J., and SANDERLIN, J., concur.
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Cooper Hotel Servs., Inc. v. Tobie MacFARLAND, 662 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ugh the exercise óf ordinary care. Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). “Negligence [however] may not be inferred from the mere happening of an accident alone.” Belden, 126 So. 2d at 581. See also East Bay Raceway v. Parham, 497 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Where the facts of a case are undisputed and the evidence ultimately leads to but one conclusion, the question of negligence becomes one of law for the trial court. Stirling, 229 So. 2d at 853. In the instant case, the undi…
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Regala Dennis v. City OF Tampa, 581 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…an insurer,” Haynes v. Lloyd, 533 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); see also Elmore, or is not legally responsible for a “mere accident,” see Meyer By and Through Meyer v. Torrey, 452 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see also East Bay Raceway v. Parham, 497 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). In most of these cases, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is such that the defendant has some legal obligation to look out for the plaintiffs safety, i.e., the defendant owes a “duty.” The more difficult qu…
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jess Abrams v. Nolan Brown Cadillac Co., 228 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Parham v. E. BAY Raceway & K & K Ins. Agency, 442 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Food Fair Stores v. Romalda M. Spinelli, 122 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Gaines v. Mooney, 237 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1970)
- Americana Hotel, Inc. v. Zable, 237 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1970)
- Lantis Harrell v. Martin, 345 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)