JOEL PETERZELL, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES URBACH, M.D., P.A., APPELLEE
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Peterzell appeals the trial court's dismissal of his lawsuit for failure to prosecute. The appellate court reversed, holding that Rule 1.420(e)'s one-year inactivity requirement was not triggered because Peterzell filed a notice for trial before the defendant's motion to dismiss, thereby breaking the gap in record activity.
The trial court improperly dismissed the case. Rule 1.420(e) was not triggered because Peterzell's filing of a notice for trial before the motion to dismiss broke the one-year gap of record inactivity. Therefore, Peterzell had no duty to show good cause in writing five days before the hearing.
[1] A trial court's inherent power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute is circumscribed by rule 1.420(e).
[2] Rule 1.420(e) requires that an action be dismissed if there has been no record activity for one year, unless a party shows good cause at least five days before a hearing…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This rule is not self-executing. "[I]t requires action by the court or the filing of a motion to dismiss, and such action must be undertaken before there is any further prosecution of the cause."”
Establishes that Rule 1.420(e) requires procedural action before further prosecution can occur, and Peterzell's filing of a notice for trial constitutes such prosecution.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePeterzell's case experienced a one-year gap in record activity from December 7, 1983 to December 13, 1984. On December 13, 1984, Peterzell filed a not…
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SHARP, Judge.
Peterzell appeals from an order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.1 The record discloses that although there was a one year gap in time (December 7, 1983 to December 13, 1984) in which there was no record activity in the case, on December 13, 1984, Peterzell filed a notice for trial. On December 27, 1984, appellee filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. We reverse.
The trial court found that Peterzell failed to comply with rule 1.420(e) by failing to show good cause why the suit should not be dismissed at least five days prior to the hearing on the motion. It also ruled it had inherent power to dismiss this cause for lack of prosecution, once a one year gap in activity occurred, despite the fact that other activity was commenced prior to appel-lee’s filing its motion.
The inherent power of a trial court to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute is circumscribed by rule 1.420(e):
All actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activity by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise has occurred for a period of one year shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person, whether a party to the action or not, after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a stipulation staying the action is approved by the court or a stay order has been filed or a party shows good cause in writing at least 5 days before the hearing on the motion why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period of less than one year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute.
This rule is not self-executing. “[I]t requires action by the court or the filing of a motion to dismiss, and such action must be undertaken before there is any further prosecution of the cause. Carter v. DeCarion, 400 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981) [review denied, 412 So. 2d 464 (Fla.1982) ].”2
Rule 1.420(e) was not properly triggered in this case because Peterzell filed his notice for trial before appellee filed its motion to dismiss, and when the motion was filed there no longer existed a one year gap of record inactivity.3 It follows that Peterzell did not have any duty under the rule to “show good cause in writing at least 5 days before the hearing,” and the trial court’s reliance on this “mandatory” requirement in dismissing the cause was misplaced.
Govayra v. Straubel, 466 So. 2d 1065 (Fla.1985) is distinguishable from this case. In Govayra, there was a twenty-eight month gap of no record activity continuing and unbroken before the trial court filed its own motion preceding the order of dismissal. Here, Peterzell filed a notice for trial, thereby breaking the gap of record inactivity. Inherent authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute beyond the parameters of rule 1.420(e) no longer exists. Fleming v. Barnett Bank of East Polk County, 490 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); American Salvage & Jobbing Co., Inc. v. Salomon, 367 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB and COWART, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(e).
. Kubera v. Fisher, 483 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
.Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. Russell, 398 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), review denied, 411 So. 2d 381 (Fla.1981); Carter v. DeCarion, 400 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 464 (Fla.1982).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Artime v. Brotman, 838 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…he ‘one year’ period specified in rule 1.420(e) is to be measured by calculating the time between the date of the last record activity and the date of the filing of the motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis supplied); Peterzell v. James Urbach, M.D., P.A., 497 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)(holding that rule 1.420 was not properly triggered when despite one year lack of activity, notice for trial was filed before motion to dismiss was filed). The filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution is thus the…
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Burk v. Value Rent-A-Car, 697 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…activity is legally sufficient under the terms of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) because it is calculated to advance Appellant’s cause to trial. See Bush v. Univest Real Estate Corp., 636 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Peterzell v. Urbach, 497 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). With legally sufficient activity appearing on the face of the record, there is no need to examine whether Appellant established good cause, as mere inactivity for a period of less than one year is not grounds for dismissal for l…
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THE Florida BAR v. O'Connor, 945 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2006)…and to not be self-executing. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollack, 116 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1959); Mitchell v. Coker Fuel, Inc., 511 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); City of Miami v. Katz, 498 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Peterzell v. James Urbach, M.D., P.A., 497 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Barnes v. Escambia County Employees Credit Union, 488 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Russell, 398 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). However, we cannot agree with the Bar that O’Connor is still under emer…
Authorities Cited
- Am. Salvage & Jobbing Co., Inc. v. Jacque Salomon, 367 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Carter v. DeCARION, 400 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Govayra v. Straubel, 466 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1985)
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Russell, 398 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Kubera v. Fisher, 483 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Fleming v. Barnett Bank OF E. Polk Cnty., 490 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)