GEORGE LAWSON IVIE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that imposing court costs under a statute that became effective after the offense occurred violates ex post facto provisions.
[1] A guilty plea is voluntary when the defendant is adequately apprised of the consequences of the plea.
[2] Imposing court costs pursuant to a statute that became effective after the commission of the offense violates ex post facto provisions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant challenged the imposition of court costs for an offense committed before the effective date of Fla. Stat. § 27.3455. The trial court denied …
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[*932] PER CURIAM.
George Ivie appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. First, Ivie attacks the voluntariness of his plea of guilty to armed robbery. Having examined the transcript of the plea colloquy, which the trial court attached to its order denying Ivie’s motion, we hold that Ivie was adequately apprised of the consequences of his plea and affirm the ruling of the trial court with respect to that issue.
We do find merit in Ivie’s second point. He questions the imposition of court costs pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985) because the offense for which he was sentenced occurred prior to the effective date of that statute. According to the factual basis for the plea, as entered into the plea colloquy, Ivie committed the robbery in February, 1985, whereas section 27.3455 did not become effective until July 1, 1985. In Yost v. State, 489 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that retroactive application of section 27.3455 violates constitutional ex post facto restrictions. This court recently followed Yost in Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Further, we have stated that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is an appropriate vehicle for objecting to an ex post facto application of section 27.3455. Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with directions to strike the imposition of court costs from Ivie’s judgment and sentence. As we did in Bowman v. State, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question of great public importance:
DOES THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 27.3455, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985) TO CRIMES COMMITTED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE STATUTE VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, OR DOES THE STATUTE MERELY EFFECT A PROCEDURAL CHANGE AS IS PERMITTED UNDER STATE V. JACKSON, 478 So. 2d 1054 (FLA. 1985)?
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…atutes (1985). Affirmed in part; reversed in part ant remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. GRIMES, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur. RYDER, J., specially concurs. . Davis v. State, 495 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Ivie v. State, 497 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Bennett v. State, 495 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Slaughter v. State, 493 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) [consolidating sixteen cases]; Miller v. State, 492 So. 2d 1191 (Fl…
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Alphonso Harris v. State, 498 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…hat on the basis of our Lawton decision, imposition of the costs in this case was reversible error even absent a contemporaneous objection. While it is true that appellant may raise these issues via a motion for postconviction relief, Ivie v. State, 497 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), we are not precluded from addressing these issues on direct appeal under the circumstances. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s assessment of court costs because the record fails to show notice of, and an opportunity to obj…
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Session v. State, 497 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…ry that the trial court must first be given the opportunity to rule on the question, that requirement was satisfied here when appellant filed a motion with the trial court to correct the illegal sentence and had his motion denied. Cf. Ivie v. State, 497 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is an appropriate vehicle for objecting to an ex post facto application of section 27.3455). As we did in Yost, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following qu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1985)
- Yost v. State, 489 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)