PASQUALE PROCACCI, PETITIONER,
v.
SAM SEITLIN, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal held that a client who waives attorney-client privilege as to communications regarding a specific transaction does not waive the privilege as to communications regarding other aspects of the attorney-client relationship. The waiver is limited only to the subject matter that was disclosed.
The court held that waiver of attorney-client privilege is limited to the communications or subjects in question. Voluntary disclosure regarding one transaction does not waive the privilege as to communications made during other aspects or matters of the attorney-client relationship.
[1] A client waives the attorney-client privilege as to specific communications by suing their attorney for malpractice concerning that transaction or by voluntarily disclosi…
[2] Waiver of the attorney-client privilege is limited to the specific communications or subjects in question.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the waiver is limited to the communications or subjects in question”
Establishes the core principle that privilege waiver is narrowly confined to the specific matter disclosed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceProcacci, a client, initiated a malpractice suit against his attorney Seitlin regarding a real estate transaction. In doing so, Procacci waived attorn…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
While the client, the petitioner Procacci, waived his attorney-client privilege as to a particular real estate transaction by suing his attorney for malpractice in the conduct of that transaction, see § 90.502(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1985), and by voluntarily disclosing the substance of the communications as to that matter in the instant suit against the other party to the transaction, the respondent Seitlin, see Hoyas v. State, 456 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (“[t]he client’s offer of his own or the attorney’s testimony as to a specific communication to the attorney is a waiver as to all other communications to the attorney on the same matter”; quoting 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2327 at 638 (McNaughton rev. 1961)), it is clear that the “waiver is limited to the communications or subjects in question.” In re Estate of Marden, 355 So. 2d 121, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 833 (Fla.1978).
We find no legal basis, therefore, for the order below, which held that the privilege had been waived as to communications made during any other aspect of the lengthy attorney-client relationship between Procacci and his lawyer. See Goldman, Sacks & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F.Supp. 286, 288 (N.D.Ill.1976) (waiver by disclosure does “not mean .. .that voluntary disclosure of confidential information effectively waives the privilege as to all conver sations, or the whole breadth of discussion which may have taken place”); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D.Cal.1978) (waiver of privilege by disclosure confined to “that specific subject during that particular conversation”; quoting Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F.Supp. at 289); United States v. Monti, 100 F.Supp. 209, 214 (E.D.N.Y.1951) (waiver of privilege by allegation that guilty plea coerced by counsel waived privilege only with respect to facts material to coercion issue); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gellert, 431 So. 2d 329, 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (waiver by disclosure limited “to other unrevealed communications only to the extent that they are relevant to the communication already disclosed”); see also Yoko v. Lindsley, 248 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (same holding as to waiver of psychiatrist-patient privilege).
Accordingly, certiorari is granted and the order under review is quashed.
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Coyne v. Schwartz, 715 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ing sued. The exclusion has been interpreted to be very limited, applying only to the particular transaction which resulted in the malpractice action, and not to any other aspects of the relationship between client and attorney. Procacci v. Seitlin, 497 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). See also Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1994)(holding privilege was waived only as to matters specifically at issue in court action).... [W]e cannot accept respondents’ and the trial court’s broad interpretation of section 9…
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Boudreau v. The Honorable James T. Carlisle, 549 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…ons with his client. By filing the malpractice suit, Amos has waived his attorney-client privilege as to communications between himself and Boudreau in connection with Boudreau’s representation during the first trial and appeal. Procacci v. Seitlin, 497 So. 2d 969 (Fla.3d DCA 1986). Such a dilemma has been avoided by the trial court denying the defendant’s motion to discharge counsel. [*1078] Thus, we find that the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law, and we hold that a trial cou…
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Chomat v. N. Ins. Co. OF NEW York & Seitlin & Co., 919 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…to their respective clients. Thus, the quoted sentence does waive the attorney-client privilege as to the stated issue: the opinion of counsel that “the case, if tried before a jury, would result in a verdict of liability.” See Procacci v. Seitlin, 497 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). We conclude that the privilege has been waived to the extent stated, but is not a general waiver regarding other issues. Elsewhere in the settlement agreement there are recitations that the parties had consulted with counsel reg…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- L.B.K., Inc. v. Union Indem. Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Hoyas v. State, 456 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Jess Yoho v. Lindsley, 248 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- In re Est. of Ben Marden v. Gertrude Bacon, 355 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)