KEITH L. HOOKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Keith Hooker was convicted of second degree murder for shooting into an occupied trailer and killing Mario Ortiz. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction but remanded for reconsideration of sentencing to properly credit time served.
The conviction for second degree murder is affirmed as the defendant's conduct satisfied the statutory definition of second degree murder as an act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind. The sentence is remanded for proper computation of credit for time served, which the trial court failed to address.
[1] An act is imminently dangerous to another and evinces a depraved mind, constituting second degree murder, if it is an act which a person of ordinary judgment would know i…
[2] A jury verdict of second degree murder is supported by evidence that the defendant fired a shot into an occupied dwelling with the intent to harm or intimidate occupants…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an act "imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design"”
Establishes the statutory definition of second degree murder under Florida law that Hooker's conduct satisfied
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHooker fired a shot at night into a trailer he believed was occupied, killing Mario Ortiz, a Guatemalan farm worker. Hooker was part of a group of men…
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LEHAN, Judge.
We affirm defendant’s conviction for second degree murder but remand for further consideration of the sentence.
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting at night into a trailer which he had reason to believe was occupied, which he believed to be occupied, and which was occupied. He killed one of the occupants, Mario Ortiz, a Guatemalan farm worker. The evidence is clear that defendant fired the shot while he was with a group of men who had gone to the area with the avowed purpose of looking for Mexicans to run out of town. Defendant first contends, citing Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287, 293 (Fla.1903), that he should have been convicted of third degree murder. We disagree. We agree with the state’s argument that defendant’s activities fell squarely within the statutory definition of second degree murder, to wit, an act “imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design_” Section 782.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). See Manuel v. State, 344 So. 2d 1317, 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (“The depravity of mind required in second degree murder has been equated with malice in the commonly understood sense of ill will, hatred, spite or evil intent.”); Marasa v. State, 394 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“An act is one imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind if it is an act which (1) a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, (2) is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent, and (3) is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life.”).
The following language from Mathis does appear to support defendant’s contention: “The unlawful killing of a human being without any design to effect death by one who wantonly or maliciously shoots at or in any dwelling or any other house which is being used or occupied is murder in the third degree.” But we do not believe that that language, which is dicta, should be construed as limiting a conviction to third degree murder under the circumstances of this case. The jury was also instructed on third degree murder, and its verdict of second degree murder was supported by the evidence.
Contrary to defendant’s second contention, we do not conclude that the trial court’s instruction on third degree murder was erroneous and reversible error. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Lawler, 151 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Owca v. Zemzicki, 137 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
Contrary to defendant’s third contention, we do not conclude under the circumstances of this case that there was reversible error in the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in refusing to conduct an inquiry of jurors after defense counsel stated that he overheard one juror comment to another juror about the facts of the case. See United States v. Chiantese, 582 F. 2d 974 (5th Cir.1978).
As his fourth contention, defendant argues that the trial court erred in leaving blank in the sentence form the space allowing credit for time served. See § 921.-161(1), Fla.Stat. (1985). The state agrees. We remand for the trial court to consider and rule upon credit for time served.
The conviction is affirmed. The sentence is reversed and remanded for computation of the correct credit time.
DANAHY, C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
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Light v. State, 841 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (victim is defendant’s wife); Larsen v. State, 485 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (victim is defendant’s wife). Hatred, spite, evil intent, or ill will usually require more than an instant to develop. See Hooker v. State, 497 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that second-degree murder established where defendant shot into occupied trailer killing stranger because of preexisting racial ill will). In this case, Mr. Light had no prior relationship with the victim prior to the vic…
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Ellison v. State, 547 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…r to fall and fracture her skull); Dellinger v. State, 495 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (defendant picked up a gun and pointed it at his wife during an argument and pulled the trigger without knowing whether or not it was loaded); Hooker v. State, 497 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (defendant shot into a trailer which he believed to be occupied by migrant workers after going on a “mission” to rid the community of such workers); Reimel v. State, 532 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (defendant shot victim who had…
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Williams v. State, 689 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…the evidence and the law; that they should not discuss feelings of prejudice, bias or sympathy; and that the verdict must not be influenced by emotion or sympathy. Therefore, Williams has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. See Hooker v. State, 497 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)(trial court’s refusal to conduct juror inquiry after defense counsel overheard a juror comment to another juror about the ease not reversible error), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1987); Murray v. State, 356 So. 2d 71,…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46 (Fla. 1903)
- United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1978)
- Marasa v. State, 394 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Luella Maxine Owca and Leo W. Owca v. Sigmund S. Zemzicki and Betty B. Zemzicki, 137 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Lawler, 151 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Manuel v. State, 344 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)