ARISTAR, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES J. ARMSTRONG, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-10-28
No. 86-56
Before NESBITT, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ., NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. concur.
497 So. 2d 1267 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Finding that the trial court erred in denying Aristar, Inc.’s [Aristar] motion for attorney’s fees following Armstrong’s voluntary dismissal of his complaint against Ar-istar, we reverse, in part, the Order on Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs and Attorney’s Fees. We remand the cause and direct the trial court first, to determine which party prevailed in the case at bar under the analogous principles enunciated in Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 486 So. 2d 597 (Fla.1986), and then, if appropriate, to exercise its discretion by ruling on the merits of Aristar’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 448.08, Florida Statutes (1981).

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. concur.

Concurrence
FERGUSON, Judge

FERGUSON, Judge

(specially concurring).

I am still firmly of the view that, for the purpose of attorney’s fees, a defendant does not become a prevailing party on the merits where a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the complaint without prejudice. In such cases the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, award reasonable fees as costs where it would be inequitable not to do so. McKelvey v. Kismet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 3d DCA) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1983). A rigid rule of law is not workable, as evidenced by the tumultuous inconsistency in the case law.

I agree to reverse and remand, not for the court to decide whether appellant is a prevailing party, but for the court to determine whether the circumstances are such that it would be unfair not to compensate Aristar for the cost of defending.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Englander v. ST. Francis Hosp., Inc., 506 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …takes the dismissal. The postponed dismissal and subsequent “summary judgment” hearing will require an investment of more attorney time and costs. The new wrinkle now added to the what-is-a-prevailing-party dilemma, see Aristar, Inc. v. Armstrong, 497 So. 2d 1267, (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (Ferguson, J., specially concurring); McKelvey v. Kismet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 3d DCA) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), rev. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1983), is that a trial court is now obligated to look behind a voluntary di…
  • Spear v. Spear, 516 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …d costs after cause is voluntarily dismissed), pet. for review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1983); McBain v. Bowling, 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (same); Brodbeck v. Gonzalez, 336 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (same); Avistar, Inc. v. Armstrong, 497 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (court has jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees after cause is voluntarily dismissed); McBain, 374 So. 2d at 76 (same). [*1133] In accordance with these views, the order denying Ms. Spear’s motion to tax costs, including those fo…

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