FRANCINE MATUSOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STANLEY MATUSOW, APPELLEE
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In a divorce case governed by a settlement agreement obligating the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees, the trial court awarded $29,000 in reasonable fees but required the husband to pay only $15,000. The appellate court affirmed, holding that while a settlement agreement requiring fee payment is enforceable, the husband's obligation is limited to fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in the domestic litigation, not necessarily all fees the wife owes to her attorneys.
A husband's agreement to pay attorney's fees in a settlement agreement requires him to pay only those fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in representing the wife in the domestic litigation, not necessarily all fees the wife may owe to her attorneys for work performed. The trial court has discretion to apportion fees between those reasonably necessary to the dissolution and those that are not.
[1] A settlement agreement in a divorce action requiring a husband to pay attorney's fees does not obligate him to pay 100% of the fees awarded if the agreement does not spec…
[2] A husband's obligation to pay attorney's fees in a divorce settlement is limited to those fees that are reasonable and necessarily incurred in representing a party in the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the husband under his agreement to pay fees should only be required to pay those fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in representing a party in the domestic litigation”
Establishes the core holding that a husband's fee obligation is limited to reasonable and necessary fees for the dissolution, not all fees the wife may owe her attorneys.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife and husband entered into a settlement agreement in contemplation of divorce providing that the husband would pay the wife's attorney's fees. …
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BARKDULL, Judge.
The appellant wife and the appellee husband entered into a settlement agreement in contemplation of divorce, which provided that the husband would pay her attorney’s fees.
In due course a divorce action was commenced and after extensive litigation, it resulted in a final judgment of dissolution wherein the trial judge retained jurisdiction to award fees.
Thereafter, following taking of testimony, the trial judge determined that the wife’s attorneys were entitled to $29,000 as a reasonable fee for services in representing her during the “past year and through the trial and hearing on attorney's fees” but, only required the husband to pay $15,-000 of this amount. This appeal ensued.
The wife contends that under the following authority, Morris v. Morris, 481 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Novack v. Novack, 305 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); See also Hancock v. Hancock, 417 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Davis v. Fisher, 391 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), the trial court was required under the agreement to make the husband pay 100% of the fee determined. The appellee responds that he is only required to pay reasonable fees incurred in connection with the representation of the wife in the dissolution proceedings. Trustees of Cameron-Brown Investment Group v. Tavormina, 385 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 357 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Allstate Insurance Company v. Baer, 334 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Bosem v. Bosem, 269 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). We recognize that where the husband agrees to pay a fixed amount, as in Novack, supra, the trial court should require him to discharge this obligation. We also recognize that in many instances counsel that represent a wife in domestic litigation may spend much time and effort that is either unnecessary or does not contribute to the resolution of the domestic litigation. See and compare Urbanek v. Urbanek, 484 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Travieso v. Travieso, 447 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Guthrie v. Guthrie, supra; Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
The wife may be obligated to her attorneys for the work expended on her behalf in its entirety, but the husband under his agreement to pay fees should only be required to pay those fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in representing a party in the domestic litigation. It appears from the limited record1 that the trial judge exercised his discretion in apportioning the fee awarded.
The order under review arrived in this court with a presumption of correctness. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Howard v. Howard, 467 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). It is incumbent on an appellant to make error appear. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1980); Lahr v. Lahr, 337 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Storer v. Storer, 305 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We fail to find, from the limited record before us, that the trial judge abused his discretion in the entry of the order under review and therefore it is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. Notwithstanding this court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction to the trial court for purposes of constructing a record pursuant to Rule 9.200(b)(3) F.A.R., the appellant has not favored us with a record, but with a very limited stipulated statement.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tucker v. Tucker, 513 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…the ex-wife’s attorney. The record leaves undifferentiated the number of hours the ex-wife’s attorney expended in matters which are properly compensable and the hours which may not fall within the range of essential services. See Matusow v. Matusow, 498 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). A review of the ex-wife’s attorney’s time records, in their entirety, is critical to determining the propriety of the many hours expended on the ex-wife’s behalf. In the event, however, counsel for the ex-wife adheres to her decl…
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Straley v. Frank, 585 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…e in the better position to determine the extent of the partial award to the wife. Any partial attorney’s fees award must be based upon the time which is reasonable and necessary to adequately represent the wife. As the court in Matusow v. Matusow, 498 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) observed: We also recognize that in many instances counsel that represent a wife in domestic litigation may spend much time and effort that is unnecessary or does not contribute to the resolution of the domestic litigation. The w…
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Straley v. Frank, 612 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…etter position to determine the extent of the partial award to the wife. Moreover, any partial attorney’s fees award must be based upon the time which is reasonable and necessary to adequately represent the wife. As the court in Matusow v. Matusow, 498 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) observed: We also recognize that in many instances counsel that represent a wife in domestic litigation may spend much time and effort that is unnecessary or does not contribute to the resolution of the domestic litigation. The w…
Authorities Cited (19 total)
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Maxine Florence Sedell (now Maxine Sedell White) v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Trs. OF Cameron-Brown Inv. Grp. v. Tavormina, 385 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Arie Lionel Bosem v. Bosem, 269 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- August Urbanek v. Urbanek, 484 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Howard v. Howard, 467 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)