LARRY HOOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Larry Hooks appealed a trial court judgment imposing costs against him after he was adjudged insolvent. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal held that some costs were improperly assessed without adequate notice and opportunity to object, and that post-sentencing court costs imposed under a statute that became effective after his crime violated ex post facto constitutional restrictions.
The court struck the costs of $20, $2, and $2 because the insolvent defendant was not given adequate notice of assessment or opportunity to object. The $200 in costs under section 27.3455 were reversed as violating ex post facto constitutional restrictions, since the statute became effective after the crime was committed. The judgment and sentence were affirmed in all other respects.
[1] A trial court must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to object before assessing costs against an insolvent defendant.
[2] The imposition of court costs pursuant to a statute that became effective after the commission of the crime violates ex post facto restrictions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since appellant was adjudged insolvent but was not given either adequate notice of the assessment, or an opportunity to object to it, we hereby strike the costs.”
Establishes the requirement for notice and opportunity to object when assessing costs against insolvent defendants.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHooks was convicted and adjudged insolvent. The trial court assessed costs against him under various statutes: $20 under section 960.20 Florida Statut…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Larry Hooks, appeals that portion of the final judgment which imposes certain costs against him. After reviewing the briefs and record on appeal, we agree the trial court erred in assessing these costs.
After adjudging the appellant insolvent, the trial court assessed costs against him in the amount of $20 pursuant to section 960.20 Florida Statutes (1985), $2 pursuant to section 943.25(4) Florida Statutes (1985), and $2 pursuant to section 943.25(8) Florida Statutes (1985). Since appellant was adjudged insolvent but was not given either adequate notice of the assessment, or an opportunity to object to it, we hereby strike the costs. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). This decision is without prejudice to the trial court assessing' costs against the appellant in accordance with the requirements of Jenkins.
We also find error in the post-sentencing imposition of $200 additional court costs pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985). Appellant’s crime of failure to appear, a violation of section 843.15, Florida Statutes (1983), was committed on November 26, 1984. Section 27.3455 became effective July 1, 1985. We therefore hold that the trial court’s imposition of court costs pursuant to this section violated constitutional ex post facto restrictions. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1; Fla.Const. art. I, § 10. We, accordingly, reverse that portion of the judgment imposing $200 court costs against the appellant under section 27.3455. See Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla.2d DCA 1986); see also, Yost v. State, 489 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
We affirm, however, the judgment and sentence in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
SCHEB, Acting C.J., and SCHOON-OVER, J., concur. RYDER, J., specially concurring.
RYDER, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur with the result of this panel, but incorporate by reference my specially concurring opinion in Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla.2d DCA 1986).
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Citator
Cited By
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Rago v. State, 498 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…imes were committed on May 24, 1985, imposition of these additional costs violated the ex post facto provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida. Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Hooks v. State, 498 So. 2d 586, (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but we vacate his sentence on the aggravated assault charge and remand for resentencing on that count. If the trial court again chooses to depart on the “timing” aspect of the…
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Yost v. State, 489 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)