BRUCE H. LYNN, M.D., P.A. PETITIONER,
v.
LUCILLE E. MILLER AND ANSON F. MILLER, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appellate court granted certiorari and reversed trial court's denial of motion to dismiss, holding that section 768.57's notice of intent requirement is constitutional and a condition precedent to maintaining a medical malpractice suit.
Section 768.57's notice of intent requirement is constitutional and a mandatory condition precedent to maintaining a medical malpractice suit, with noncompliance requiring dismissal.
[1] Compliance with the notice of intent requirements of section 768.57, Florida Statutes, is a mandatory condition precedent to maintaining a medical malpractice action, and…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Compliance with the requirements of the statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit and one which must be satisfied within the applicable statute of limitations.”
Court explaining that section 768.57 compliance is mandatory and must occur within statutory time limits.
Respondents filed a medical malpractice complaint against Dr. Lynn without first complying with the notice of intent requirements of section 768.57, F…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Condition Precedent To Suit cases and more on FLexlaw
HALL, Judge.
Lynn, a defendant in a pending medical malpractice suit below, petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review an order of the trial court denying Lynn’s motion to dismiss.
Respondents filed their complaint against Lynn without first complying with the “notice of intent” requirements of section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1985). Lynn moved to dismiss. The trial court found that section 768.57 was unconstitutional and denied the motion. We have previously held that the statute is constitutional, Pearlstein v. Malunney, — So. 2d -, No. 86-2119 (Fla. 2d DCA December 10, 1986) [11 F.L.W. — ], and so find that the trial court’s order represents a departure .from the essential requirements of law. As in Pearlstein, we approve the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Knuck, 495 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), including the analogy therein to the similarly worded notice requirements of our sovereign immunity statute. Compliance with the requirements of the statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit and one which must be satisfied within the applicable statute of limitations (which, in the case of section 768.57, is tolled during the 90-day presuit screening period). If the limitations period has expired the trial court lacks the authority to abate a premature complaint even if, but for the prefiling notice requirements, that complaint would otherwise have been timely.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANAHY, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Hosp. Corp. OF Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1990)…ad filed a complaint but had served notice on only one of the defendants in the case within the limitations period, resulting in dismissal with prejudice as to the defendants not receiving timely notice. See also Bruce H. Lynn, M.D., P.A. v. Miller, 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The Lind-bergs’ situation is similar to that in Nash v. Humana Sun Bay Community Hospital, Inc., 526 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988), in which the Second District held that notices of intent t…
-
Lindberg v. Hosp. Corp. OF Am., 545 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…to the continuation of plaintiffs’ suit against the doctors and institutions not receiving timely notice. The Third District therefore granted a writ of prohibition, prohibiting revival of the action against the defendant doctors. In Lynn v. Miller, 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the court held that in line with the Knuck decision, it was essential that compliance with the statutory notice requirements be completed prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations, and if the limitations perio…
-
Shands Teaching Hosp. v. Miller, 642 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla.1993); Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982 (Fla.1991); Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1991); Hospital Corp. of America v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446 (Fla.1990); Bruce H. Lynn, M.D., P.A v. Miller, 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Public Health Trust v. Knuck, 495 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). But see Kukral v. Mekras, 1994 WL 189644,19 Fla. Law Weekly D1108 (Fla. 3d DCA May 17, 1994). In the instant case, the limitations period had run, and the trial cou…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. The Honorable Francis X. Knuck, 495 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)