FRANCES KEESEE, APPELLANT,
v.
ESTATE OF RICHARD L. NEELY, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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Frances Keesee and Edith Joan Gunter received insurance policy proceeds as beneficiaries of Richard Neely's life insurance and were required to pay their pro-rata shares of federal estate tax. This appeal addresses whether the personal representative was required to refund the taxes paid by the beneficiaries, with the court affirming the trial court's denial of the refund petitions based on the statutory apportionment of estate taxes among insurance beneficiaries.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of both refund petitions, holding that although estoppel by judgment did not properly apply to bar Keesee's petition due to lack of identical parties, the trial court correctly decided the motion to dismiss because the ambiguous language in the will supports reliance upon Florida Statute section 733.817(1)(e), which requires equitable apportionment of estate taxes among recipients of taxable property, including insurance beneficiaries.
[1] A will's direction to pay estate taxes is controlling over statutory apportionment rules unless the will's language is ambiguous.
[2] Statutory apportionment of estate taxes applies to insurance proceeds when the will does not clearly direct otherwise.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The balance of the net amount of the tax, including, but not limited to, any tax imposed concerning gifts in contemplation of death, jointly held properties passing by survivorship, property passing by intestacy, or insurance, shall be equitably apportioned among, and paid by, the recipients and beneficiaries of the properties or interests, in the proportion that the value of the property or interest of each included in the measure of the tax bears to the total value of all properties and interests included in the measure of the tax, except as otherwise directed by the will.”
Establishes the statutory requirement for equitable apportionment of federal estate taxes among beneficiaries of taxable property, including insurance proceeds, unless the will directs otherwise.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrances Keesee and Edith Joan Gunter were beneficiaries of a life insurance policy on Richard Neely, each receiving proceeds exceeding $100,000. The p…
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FRANK, Judge.
Frances Keesee and Edith Joan Gunter are the beneficiaries of an insurance policy on the life of Richard Neely. Upon Neely’s death each beneficiary received proceeds in excess of $100,000.00. The personal representative of Neely’s estate advised both Keesee and Gunter that each was liable for a share of the federal estate tax. Each beneficiary subsequently paid her pro-rata portion of the tax.
The will provides:
I direct my personal representative to pay all expenses incident to my last illness and death, and to pay all estate and inheritance taxes and other governmental taxes and charges, if any, legally imposed on my estate or any part of it; provided however, the payment of any indebtedness or of any tax, except where the payment thereof shall be required by law to be made, shall be left to the discretion of my personal representative.
The relevant statute provides:
The balance of the net amount of the tax, including, but not limited to, any tax imposed concerning gifts in contemplation of death, jointly held properties passing by survivorship, property passing by intestacy, or insurance, shall be equitably apportioned among, and paid by, the recipients and beneficiaries of the properties or interests, in the proportion that the value of the property or interest of each included in the measure of the tax bears to the total value of all properties and interests included in the measure of the tax, except as otherwise directed by the will. § 733.817(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1985).
Gunter filed a petition with the trial court seeking a determination that the personal representative was required to refund the amount of the tax she had paid. The trial court denied Gunter’s petition based upon the will’s ambiguous language and concluded that section 733.817(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), controlled the payment of taxes associated with the insurance proceeds. Keesee, too, filed a petition seeking the return of the portion she had paid but her petition was filed after the one filed by Gunter. In disposing of Keesee’s petition, the trial court concluded that Kee-see was estopped by the judgment entered upon Gunter’s claim.
Although the trial court reached the correct result, we find that it erroneously relied upon the theory of estoppel by judgment as the basis for denying Keesee’s petition.
Estoppel by judgment requires that the real parties in interest in each action be identical. Further, the issue in the case in which estoppel is applied must be identical to the necessary and material issues settled in the prior litigation. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company v. Cox, 338 So. 2d 190 (Fla.1976).
The present matter lacks the necessary identity of parties to permit applica tion of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. Zurich Insurance Company v. Bartlett, 352 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Nevertheless, the motion to dismiss Keesee’s petition for the refund of the tax she paid was correctly decided. The ambiguity in the will supports the trial court’s reliance upon section 733.817(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985).
We affirm.
DANAHY, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
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Waqar Ahmad (Mickey) Khan v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 687 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…o. 2d 372 (Fla.1977). “In dealing with the identities of parties, collateral estop-pel requires that the ‘real parties in interest’ be identical.” R.D.J. Enter., Inc. v. Mega Bank, 600 So. 2d 1229, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Keesee v. Estate of Neely, 498 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (estoppel by judgment requires that the real parties in interest in each action be identical). Florida, unlike the federal courts, for example, has traditionally required that there be a mutuality of parties in order for the…
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Authorities Cited
- Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. COX, 338 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1976)
- Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 352 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)