JENNIE J. QUAST, APPELLANT,
v.
CLIFFORD G. QUAST, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case on second appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed whether a trial court's order of distribution properly accounted for jointly owned stock. The court affirmed the trial court's order of distribution as a proper enforcement of a previously affirmed final judgment of dissolution, but reversed and remanded to require inclusion of 676 shares of Mobil Oil stock that had been omitted from the distribution order.
The order of distribution was properly entered as an enforcement of the previously affirmed final judgment, and the law of the case doctrine prevents relitigation of issues already ruled upon. However, the trial court erred by failing to include 676 shares of Mobil Oil stock held by the appellee in its order of distribution, either by requiring transfer of half the shares or by crediting the appellant's share against other required transfers.
[1] The doctrine of the law of the case precludes relitigation of all issues necessarily ruled upon in a prior appeal, as well as issues that could have been appealed but wer…
[2] An appellate court's prior affirmance of a final judgment establishes the law of the case, preventing a second appeal of the original decree.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law of the case precludes relitigation of all issues necessarily ruled on by the court, as well as all issues upon which an appeal could have been taken but which were not appealed.”
Establishes the primary legal principle that prevents the appellant from relitigating issues from the original decree that had already been affirmed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn April 1983, the trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, dividing joint and individual properties. That judgment was …
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WARNER, MARTHA C., Associate Judge.
This is the second appearance of this case in this court.
On April 5, 1983, a final judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage was entered after a final hearing in which the appellant appeared pro se. The final judgment determined special equities and divided all other properties of the parties owned jointly and individually. That judgment was appealed, and this court per curiam affirmed on February 29, 1984.
Thereafter, the appellee filed a motion in the lower court to enforce the final judgment. The parties ultimately filed lists of their assets, and the appellee filed a motion for distribution of those assets in accordance with the original final judgment which had been affirmed on appeal. On April 25, 1985, the court rendered an order of distribution. The court ordered the appellant to transfer cash, stock, and personalty to the appellee, and if appellant failed to make the transfers, the court would enter a final judgment as to all items without further hearing.
Appellant filed a motion for rehearing of the order of distribution which was denied, and on June 3, 1985, final judgment was rendered because of appellant’s failure to comply with the order of distribution. Appellant then filed her appeal.
Appellant claims that the order of distribution was unfair and unconstitutional. However, to support her claim she argues that the trial court in the original hearing made errors. The original decree has already been affirmed on appeal, this establishing the law of the case. State v. Stabile, 443 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The law of the case precludes relitigation of all issues necessarily ruled on by the court, as well as all issues upon which an appeal could have been taken but which were not appealed. Id. at 400. This appeal is an attempt to obtain a second appeal of the original decree, which is not permitted. Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1965).
However, as to the issue directed solely to the order of distribution, the appellant is correct in claiming that the trial court failed to include in the order the 676 shares of Mobil Oil stock jointly owned by the parties which are held by the appellee. In his response to the motion for rehearing on the order of distribution, the appellee admitted as much. Thus, the final order of distribution should have taken into account these shares of stock, either by requiring one-half of them to be distributed to appellant or by crediting her share of them against any transfers required to effectuate the order. Upon remand, the trial court should include these shares of stock in its order of distribution.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with direction.
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING AND/OR CLARIFICATION
ORDERED that Appellant’s December 3, 1986 motion for rehearing is denied.
ORDERED that Appellee’s December 4, 1986 motion for rehearing and/or motion for clarification of the November 19, 1986 Order awarding attorney’s fees to appellant is granted and that portion of the order awarding appellant attorney’s fees is vacated. Appellant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees would require that the appellant had incurred the expense and the obligation of having an attorney represent her.
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Generazio v. State, 727 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…have been raised in the prior appeal. [Warren] had ample opportunity to file his own appeal from his conviction and he failed to do so. He should not be permitted to file a long delayed appeal now. Id. (citations omitted); see also Quast v. Quast, 498 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(stating that law of the ease doctrine precludes relitigation of issues necessarily ruled upon by the court, as well as all issues upon which an appeal could have been taken but were not). We have also considered whether th…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1965)
- Kingsway Condo. Apts. NO. 1, Inc. v. Kingsway Builders, Inc., 443 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- State v. Stabile, 443 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)