ALL AMERICAN WHEEL WORLD, INC. & FAWA SELF INSURERS FUND, APPELLANTS,
v.
JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation case, appellants challenged a deputy commissioner's order finding that an employee's automobile accident was a compensable injury because it occurred while the employee was traveling to medical treatment for his primary work-related injury. The court affirmed, holding that the subsequent accident was a natural consequence of the primary industrial injury and lacked any independent intervening cause that would break the chain of causation.
The court held that the subsequent automobile accident was compensable because it was a natural consequence of the primary work-related injury. The accident was not an independent intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation, particularly where the employee was traveling for necessary medical treatment and had not recovered from the primary injury.
[1] An accident occurring while an employee is traveling to receive medical treatment for a compensable injury is compensable, provided the employee has not yet reached maxim…
[2] A subsequent injury is a natural consequence of a primary work-related injury and thus compensable, unless it results from an independent intervening cause that breaks th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence of that injury likewise arises out of the employment unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation.”
This quote establishes the legal standard for determining whether a subsequent injury is compensable as a natural consequence of a work-related injury.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEmployee Gustafson suffered a compensable back injury on September 10, 1984, and received treatment from an authorized chiropractor, Dr. Yandell. By O…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellants seek review of a workers’ compensation order by which they were ordered to pay temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, penalties and costs.
Appellants contend the deputy commissioner erred in finding a subsequent accident that occurred during an automobile trip for medical treatment to be compensable. We affirm.
Appellee on September 10, 1984 injured his back in a compensable accident. An authorized chiropractor, Dr. Thomas Yan-dell, examined appellee and scheduled 13 appointments for physical therapy at his office. Appellee’s back condition improved, and on October 5, 1984, Dr. Yandell released appellee to return to work with a 10-to 15-pound lifting restriction. Appel-lee was to see Dr. Yandell on November 8, 1984, but, apparently because of transportation problems, he failed to keep the appointment. The following day at approximately 8:55 a.m., appellee was injured in an automobile accident while a passenger in a friend’s vehicle. Appellee stated he was en route to Dr. Yandell’s office at the time of the accident. Dr. Yandell testified that he routinely accepts patients for treatment whenever they show up even though they might have scheduled appointments for other times. In a report following appel-lee’s second accident, Dr. Yandell stated that at the time of appellee’s automobile accident, he had not fully recovered from his industrial accident, and had not reached maximum medical improvement.
The e/c on January 9, 1985 deauthorized further treatment, refusing to pay benefits following the automobile accident. Appel-lee on January 10, 1985 filed a claim for temporary benefits from November 9, 1984 to January 20, 1985. The e/c defended on the ground that appellee’s intervening automobile accident was the sole and proximate cause of his present medical problems. In his order, the deputy commissioner awarded TTD benefits from November 9, 1984 through January 20, 1985, finding the subsequent accident to be compensable because appellee was traveling to Dr. Yan-dell’s office for treatment when the accident occurred, and because appellee had not yet recovered from his first accident at the time of the subsequent accident.
We find no error in the award. “When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence of that injury likewise arises out of the employment unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation.” Central Concrete Co., Inc. v. Harris, 475 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), citing D’Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac, 393 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.1980).
The unrebutted testimony in this case is that at the time of the subsequent accident, appellee was traveling to the office of Dr. Yandell for treatment related to his primary industrial accident.
The order is affirmed.
BOOTH, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Telcon, Inc. v. Williams, 500 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…eld that an injury to a claimant during a trip to his doctor’s office for treatment of a prior compensable injury arises out of and is in the course and scope of his employment under the Florida statute. All American Wheel World, Inc., v. Gustafson, 499 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). While we find these authorities persuasive, they do not fully answer the question here presented. In the cited cases, at the time of both injuries the respective claimants remained actively employed by the employer responsible…1 / 2
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D.O.T. v. King, 554 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…injuries sustained in the pursuit of medical [*1193] treatment may be compensable when the treatment relates to a compensable injury. See e.g., Telcon Inc. v. Williams, 500 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); All American Wheel World, Inc. v. Gustafson, 499 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, the independent and intervening negligence of a third party may place a subsequent injury outside the chain of industrial causation, so as to render it noncompensable. See D’Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac, 393 So. 2d 10…
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Little Caesar's Pizza & Hartford Ins. v. Ingersoll, 572 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…within the chain of industrial causation. We find that the judge’s reliance on King was appropriate in this case since claimant was returning from swimming at the time of his automobile accident. See also All American Wheel World, Inc. v. Gustafson, 499 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The recently enacted Ch. 90-201, § 14, Laws of Fla. reads as follows: Subsequent Intervening Accidents. — Injuries caused by a subsequent intervening accident arising from an outside agency which are the direct and natural con…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- D'Angelo Plastering Co. & United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Richard Isaac & the Fla. Indus. Relations Comm'n, 393 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1980)
- Cent. Concrete Co., Inc. v. Harris, 475 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)