THOMAS C. GAINEY, III, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIEND, THOMAS GAINEY AND GUANITA GAINEY AND THOMAS GAINEY AND GUANITA GAINEY, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM PERKINS, D/B/A BLUE BALL CHEMICAL COMPANY, APPELLEE
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This product liability appeal concerns whether a manufacturer can avoid liability for inadequate warnings when the product user did not personally read the label. The court holds that if a consumer causes the label to be read to her and uses the product accordingly, her failure to personally read it does not shield the manufacturer from liability for warning deficiencies.
The manufacturer is not insulated from liability for inadequate warnings merely because the user did not personally read the label; where the consumer causes the label to be read to her and uses the product in accordance with the label, her failure to personally read it does not shield the manufacturer from liability. The existence of a factual dispute regarding whether the label was actually read to the user, and the extent to which any warning failure caused injury, are matters for jury resolution.
[1] A manufacturer may be liable for inadequate product warnings even if the end-user did not personally read the label, provided the label was read to the user and the produ…
[2] A plaintiff's failure to personally read a product label does not insulate a manufacturer from liability for inadequate warnings if the user relied on another person who…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where the consumer causes the label to be read to her and uses the product in accordance with the label, her failure to personally read the label does not insulate the manufacturer from liability for inadequacy of warning”
Establishes the core holding that personal reading of a label is not a prerequisite to manufacturer liability for inadequate warnings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA 15-month-old child ingested Blue Ball Rat Poison that had been placed in a pan under a coffee table by his great-grandmother, Mrs. Duncan, who was c…
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NIMMONS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of the defendant/appel-lee in a product liability case. Because the record reflects genuine issues of material fact, we reverse.
The record shows that the 15 month-old appellant, Thomas C. Gainey, III, while being cared for in the home of his great-grandmother, Juanita Duncan, ingested some Blue Ball Rat Poison (manufactured by the appellee) which had been placed overnight in a pan under a coffee table by Mrs. Duncan. The child became ill and required emergency treatment.
Mrs. Duncan had experienced a rat problem and had obtained the rat poison from a neighbor. In view of Mrs. Duncan’s eyesight deficiency, the neighbor read to Mrs. Duncan the instructions and warning from the container’s label.1
Appellants filed suit against appellee alleging negligence based upon the inadequacy of the instructions and warning on the product’s label. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that Mrs. Duncan, the person using the rat poison, did not herself read the label before using the product. Two weeks prior to the hearing on appel-lee’s motion for summary judgment, appellants filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (attached to the motion) which contained theories of liability additional to the one contained in the existing complaint. Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant/appellee. On the same day, the trial court denied, as moot, appellants’ motion for leave to file the second amended complaint.
We are presented with the rather narrow issue of whether, as a prerequisite to appellants’ recovery on the basis of alleged inadequacy of the warnings and instructions on the product label, Mrs. Duncan as user of the product must herself have read the label.2
Although the issue has apparently not been addressed in Florida, it is apparent to us that where the consumer causes the label to be read to her and uses the product in accordance with the label, her failure to personally read the label does not insulate the manufacturer from liability for inadequacy of warning. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Company, 552 F.Supp. 1293 (D.C.1982) (manufacturer not insulated by fact that employer read instructions on label to employees using herbicide paraquat). The cases cited by appellee3 for the contrary conclusion are not controlling. In those cases, the user in no way depended upon the warning or lack thereof in using the product. In that circumstance, there is no causal link between a failure to warn and the occurrence of an injury.
It appears from the various affidavits and depositions of record that there is a factual dispute as to whether the label was read to Mrs. Duncan or whether the use was merely explained. The extent to which any failure of the manufacturer to warn caused the injury is of course an issue for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., Edwards v. California Chemical Company, 245 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
Appellants also assert that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the appellants’ motion for leave to amend prior to granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment and then denying the motion to amend as moot. We agree with appellants. On remand, the trial court should grant appellants leave to file the proffered second amended complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . There is some dispute as to whether the neighbor merely explained the instructions or actually read them to Mrs. Duncan. One affidavit says that she actually read them. Of course, for purposes of summary judgment, the facts must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
. We do not have before us, and do not address, the issue of the adequacy of the label, nor have we been called upon to decide whether the product was used in accordance with the instructions and warnings on the label.
. Ashby Division of Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Dobkin, 458 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984); Drackett Products Co. v. Blue, 152 So. 2d 463 (Fla.1963).
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Powermatic, Inc. v. Bismar Gonzalez, 688 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…; Tallahassee Furniture Co., Inc. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), review denied, 595 So. 2d 558 (Fla.1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. McKenzie, 502 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 511 So. 2d 299 (Fla.1987); Gainey v. Perkins, 500 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 381 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), app’d, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla.1981).…
Authorities Cited
- Ashby Div. OF Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Dobkin, 458 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- The Drackett Prods. Co. v. Blue, 152 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1963)
- Gen. Cap. Corp. v. TEL Serv. Co., Inc., 245 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)