JOE HADEN JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joe Haden Johnson appeals his conviction for attempted escape from a correctional facility, raising claims of speedy trial violation, sufficiency of the charging document, and denial of self-representation. The appellate court affirms the conviction but flags potential ineffective assistance of counsel concerns.
The trial court did not err on any of the issues raised. The speedy trial clock commenced from appointment of counsel, and trial occurred within the required timeframe. However, the court reserved Johnson's right to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to concerns about whether counsel adequately informed Johnson of his appointment.
[1] A pro se motion filed by a defendant who is represented by counsel is a nullity.
[2] The speedy trial rule commences upon the appointment of counsel for an insolvent defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court ruled that the order appointing counsel marked the point for commencement of the speedy trial rule”
Establishes when the speedy trial period begins, rejecting Johnson's argument that it commenced from arrest date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn December 15, 1984, Johnson, an inmate at a Department of Corrections facility, climbed the perimeter fence and attempted to escape but was shot and…
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JOANOS, Judge.
Johnson appeals his judgment and sentence for attempted escape, alleging the trial court erred on the following grounds: (1) in denying his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule, (2) in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal, (3) in denying his ore tenus motion to represent himself, and (4) in finding the information adequate to vest jurisdiction in the trial court. We affirm, but consider the circumstances of this case warrant further discussion.
Johnson was tried before a jury and found guilty as charged of attempted escape from the custody of the Department of Corrections Reception and Medical Center (RMC) at Lake Butler. The specifics surrounding the attempted escape are set forth in the “Arrest/Sworn Complaint” filed with the clerk on December 28, 1984, which stated in relevant part:
Inmate Johnson did on December 15, 1984, at approximately 1:57 PM, climb the RMC perimeter fence between Towers # 5 and # 6, and attempt to escape; inmate Johnson was downed by rifle fire from Towers # 5 and/or # 6. He was returned to the RMC Hospital for treatment of his wounds and is now in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
On January 2, 1985, an order was entered finding Johnson insolvent as defined by law, and appointing the public defender to represent him. The information charging Johnson with attempted escape was filed on January 18, 1985. Subsequently, Johnson’s appointed counsel filed a demand for copy of the information and a written plea of not guilty. The written not-guilty plea bears the signature of counsel, but was not signed by Johnson. Thereafter, Johnson’s appointed counsel proceeded with discovery.
On June 28, 1985, Johnson filed a pro se motion for discharge, alleging (1) that he had been arrested on December 15, 1984, for attempted escape; (2) that he had been continuously available for trial since that date; (3) that more than six months had elapsed since the date of his arrest; and (4) that he had not waived his right to speedy trial and had not caused a delay in trial.
A jury was selected on July 22, 1985. Then on July 23, 1985, Johnson filed a pro se motion to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency of the information to charge a criminal offense. The case proceeded to trial on July 25, 1985.
In chambers before trial began, Johnson’s counsel advised the trial court that he had not received a copy of the pro se motion to discharge, and had only become aware of the motion on July 22, 1985, when the jury was selected. Defense counsel adopted the thrust of the pro se motion, and asked the trial court to entertain an ore tenus motion to discharge. The trial court ruled that the order appointing counsel marked the point for commencement of the speedy trial rule, but found the pro se motion for discharge a nullity, because Johnson was represented by counsel at the time he filed his pro se motion. The court then received defense counsel’s ore tenus motion of July 25, 1985. The ore tenus motion for discharge was also denied, because Johnson was brought to trial within the time period required by the rule. Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.191(i)(4).
We find no error on the part of the trial court with respect to any of the issues raised in this appeal, and therefore affirm on all points. However, because our examination of the record raises a serious question concerning the possible failure of Johnson’s counsel to advise Johnson that counsel had been appointed to represent him, and the possibility of prejudice to Johnson as a result thereof, our affirmance is without prejudice to Johnson’s right to file a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are affirmed, with reservation of Johnson’s right to file a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 2009)…erson who is suffering from this inadequacy is not permitted to do so. Simply ignoring a pretrial assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in post conviction relief proceedings. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 501 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The supposed rule that all pro se filings by represented defendants are a nullity thus makes no sense, at least in the circumstance of ineffective assistance of counsel, and may lead to a manifest injustice. It will almost surel…
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Salser v. State, 582 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…91 procedure because it was not filed or signed by appellant’s counsel. Although criminal defendants represented by counsel frequently file pro se motions, there is relatively little case law treating this issue. The leading case, Johnson v. State, 501 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), is typical of the fact pattern involved in such cases and is similar to the present case. In Johnson, the First District Court of Appeal concluded that a pro se motion for discharge was a nullity and that the defendant’s remedy,…
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Graves v. State, 642 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…erson who is suffering from this inadequacy is not permitted to do so. Simply ignoring a pretrial assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in post conviction relief proceedings. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 501 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The supposed rule that all pro se filings by represented defendants are a nullity thus makes no sense, at least in the circumstance of ineffective assistance of counsel, and may lead to a manifest injustice. It will almost surel…
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