JOSEPH WAYNE WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joseph Wayne Walker appeals his felony battery conviction under Florida Statute §231.06 for committing battery upon a school board employee. Walker challenges the statute as unconstitutional on equal protection and vagueness grounds, arguing it impermissibly classifies people into those subject to school discipline and those who are not. The appellate court affirms the conviction and upholds the statute's constitutionality.
Section 231.06 is constitutional. The statute does not violate equal protection because it serves legitimate state interests and uses a reasonably related means to achieve those ends. The statute is not void for vagueness because its prohibition is clear and unambiguous.
[1] A statute enhancing the penalty for battery upon a school board employee, distinguishing between those subject to school discipline and those who are not, does not violat…
[2] A statute prohibiting battery upon a school board employee is not void for vagueness when its prohibition is clear and unambiguous.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the division of people for sentencing purposes into two classes (those subject to the discipline of the school and those who are not) violates the equal protection clause and is void for vagueness”
Summarizes Walker's constitutional challenges to the statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWalker, a parent, was convicted after jury trial of battery upon a school board employee in violation of §231.06, Florida Statutes. The statute enhanc…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Appellant, a parent, appeals his conviction, after jury trial, of battery upon a school board employee in violation of section 231.06, Florida Statutes (1985). He challenges the constitutionality of that statute on the ground that the division of people for sentencing purposes into two classes (those subject to the discipline of the school and those who are not) violates the equal protection clause and is void for vagueness.1 Significant to this issue is the fact that a section 784.03 battery constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree calling for incarceration of not more than one year, while the section 231.06 battery is enhanced to a felony of the third degree carrying a penalty of incarceration up to five years. We affirm.
Section 231.06 was enacted under the state’s “police power,” which derives from the state’s sovereign right to enact laws for the protection of its citizens. Such power, however, is not boundless and is confined to those acts which may be reasonably construed as expedient for protection of the public health, safety, welfare or morals. State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla.1986).
The obvious purpose of the statute is to maintain and protect the integrity of the school setting and the standing of teachers as role models. Moreover, it also protects school employees against physical attacks primarily from outsiders, which in turn insulates the state’s school children from violence and deters outsiders from disrupting the educational process. These legislative aims are legitimate state interests and the statute’s effect is a reasonably related means to achieve its intended end. Thus, we do not find that an elite class has been established; neither do we find the statute to be vague. Its prohibition is clear and unambiguous. Saiez.
We find section 231.06 to be constitutional.
AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. . 231.06 Assault or battery upon district school board employee; penalties. — Whenever any parent or other person not subject to the discipline of the school commits an assault or battery upon any person employed in any capacity by a district school board and the employee is on school property or is away from school property on official school business, the offense for which the person is charged shall be classified: (1) In the case of an assault, as a misdemean-or of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) In the case of a battery, as a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.-082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
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Todd v. State, 643 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…perpetrated against religious institutions. The statute’s enhanced penalties for acts against such institutions are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Therefore, the law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Walker v. State, 501 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (assault and battery statute which divides people for sentencing purposes into two classes, i.e., those subject to the discipline of the school and who are not, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because the legislative…
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In the Interest of K.G. v. State, 556 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…PER CURIAM. Appellant, a student, appeals an order of disposition finding him guilty of battery upon a school bus driver in violation of section 231.06, Florida Statutes (1987).1 Relying on Walker v. State, 501 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), appellant contends (in part) that this statute is intended to protect school employees against physical attacks primarily from outsiders, and that the facts in this case are not within the legislative intent described in Walker,…
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McMILLON v. State, 681 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…a plea of nolo contendere to the latter charge and was placed on probation. On appeal, McMillon argues that section 231.06 does not apply to him because, as a school district employee, the statute is meant to protect him. He cites Walker v. State, 501 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), which states that one purpose of the statute is to protect school employees against attack “primarily from outsiders.” Walker is inapplicable because it interprets the 1985 version of section 231.06. The legislature amended…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Salvadore Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986)