MICHAEL K. REILLY, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA STATE HOSPITAL, APPELLEE
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This case addresses whether a trial court properly authorized involuntary psychiatric treatment without express informed consent. The appellate court reverses because the trial court failed to make the required statutory finding that the proposed treatment is not experimental and does not present an unreasonable risk of serious side effects.
The trial court's orders authorizing involuntary treatment must be reversed and remanded because the court failed to make the required statutory finding that the treatment is not experimental and does not present an unreasonable risk of serious side effects, and there was no record evidence supporting such a finding.
[1] A court order authorizing treatment over a patient's objection must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the treatment is not experimental and does not pres…
[2] A court must consider specific factors, including the patient's expressed preference, the probability of adverse side effects, and the prognosis with and without treatmen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the treatment not consented to is not experimental and does not present an unreasonable risk of serious, hazardous, or irreversible side effects”
Establishes the statutory requirement that must be met before involuntary treatment can be authorized
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMichael K. Reilly was charged with aggravated battery, declared incompetent to stand trial, and committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitati…
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[*41] PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from final orders entered pursuant to Section 916.107(3), Florida Statutes (1985), authorizing treatment and approving the continuation of treatment to be administered to appellant1 without his express and informed consent. We must reverse because there was no determination made below that “the treatment not consented to is not experimental and does not present an unreasonable risk of serious, hazardous, or irreversible side effects” as required by Section 916.107(3).
Section 916.107(3)(a)3 provides, in pertinent part with emphasis added, the following:
At the hearing on the issue of whether the court should enter an order authorizing treatment for which a patient has refused to give express and informed consent, the court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is mentally ill or mentally retarded as defined in this chapter, that the treatment not consented to is essential to the care of the patient, and that the treatment not consented to is not experimental and does not present an unreasonable risk of serious, hazardous, or irreversible side effects. In arriving at the substitute judgment decision, the court must consider at least the following factors:
a. The patient’s expressed preference regarding treatment;
b. The probability of adverse side effects;
c. The prognosis without treatment; and
d. The prognosis with treatment.
The trial court’s order approving treatment and order approving continuation of treatment, although making other required findings, do not specifically find that the treatment is not experimental and does not present an unreasonable risk of serious, hazardous, or irreversible side effects. Moreover, even though the trial court’s order indicates that the probability of adverse side effects was considered, we find no record evidence upon which such a consideration could have been based. The attending psychiatrist testified but was not asked the pertinent questions, and no other evidence was introduced on this statutorily required finding.
We must reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
BOOTH, C.J., and MILLS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Appellant, who had been charged with aggravated battery, was declared incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on December 26, 1984. After being admitted to the Florida State Hospital, commitment was extended for one year.
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Meeker v. State, 584 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…vincing evidence” substantiates the stated conclusions. Such findings of merely conclusory character do nothing to facilitate review, or to identify the basis on which the court reached the necessary conclusion. See Reilly v. Florida State Hospital, 502 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Aside from the facial insufficiency of the order, the significant legal and factual dispute here relates to the entire omission of any evidence that the appellant’s “treatment team” had ever “deemed necessary” (or even consider…