JAMES H. BROWN, PETITIONER,
v.
SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY JAIL, AND MORTON SALT COMPANY, RESPONDENTS
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James Brown, a pro se plaintiff in a civil lawsuit who is incarcerated in state custody, sought habeas corpus relief challenging a trial court order barring his attendance at all future hearings and requiring motions to be decided by written memorandum without oral argument. The appellate court held that while trial courts have discretion to issue such orders, the trial court must balance specific factors before doing so, and reversed because the record did not support the exclusion order.
Trial courts have discretion to restrict an incarcerated litigant's courtroom attendance, but this discretion must be exercised based on a balancing of specific factors including transportation costs, security risks, substantiality of the issues, need for expedited disposition, probability of success, and the inmate's interest in presenting testimony in person. The trial court's order was reversed because it was not supported by findings addressing these factors.
[1] A trial court's discretion to bar an incarcerated plaintiff from attending future hearings and requiring future motions to be decided by memo without oral argument is not…
[2] Before barring an incarcerated party from attending hearings or requiring motions to be decided by memo, a trial court must balance various factors, including the costs a…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We do not question that the court has discretion to enter such an order. However, we conclude that the exercise of that discretion is not supported by the record.”
Establishes that trial courts have discretion to restrict inmate attendance, but the discretion must be supported by the record, not exercised arbitrarily.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown is an incarcerated plaintiff in a civil lawsuit against the Sheriff of Broward County Jail and Morton Salt Company. The trial court entered an o…
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PER CURIAM.
We treat the pro se petition for an extraordinary writ as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948).
Petitioner, the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, is incarcerated in the custody of the State Department of Corrections. The trial court has entered an order barring all future attendance by petitioner at hearings, and providing that all future pretrial motions in the case will be decided by memo, and without oral argument.
We do not question that the court has discretion to enter such an order. However, we conclude that the exercise of that discretion is not supported by the record. Price v. Johnston; Stone v. Morris, 546 F. 2d 780 (7th Cir.1976). The following factors, among others, should be balanced by the trial court before making its determination:
[C]osts and inconvenience of transporting a prisoner from his place of incarceration to the courtroom, any potential danger or security risk which the presence of a particular inmate would pose to the court, the substantiality of the matter at issue, the need for an early determination of the matter, the possibility of delaying trial until the prisoner is released, the probability of success on the merits, the integrity of the correctional system, and the interests of the inmate in presenting his testimony in person rather than by deposition.
Stone at 735-86.
Respondents argue that Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1972), supports the trial court’s decision. However, in Anderson, before the trial court determined that the attendance of petitioner was not required, it made findings based on a record which supported that decision. Here, as far as the record reflects, petitioner was barred simply because he was in state custody.
Included among potential factors to be considered are: the risk and danger of escape; the need for expedited disposition of the case; costs to the state and defense; inconvenience to the state, defense, and court; security precautions; the availability of transportation without court order; the nature of the hearing; the recommendations, policies, and standard procedures of the Department of Corrections; whether oral argument is generally accorded others without motion; the impact of court-ordered transportation and lodging on the state and sheriff; and any other relevant factors.
Therefore we grant the petition, and reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
DOWNEY, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
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Waugh v. Caren Waugh, 679 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
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Adkins v. Winkler, 592 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ecause he or she is unable to attend a hearing or trial, in the absence of findings regarding the inmate’s inability to be present. See, e.g., Leone v. Florida Power Corp., 567 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Brown v. Sheriff of Broward County Jail, 502 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Under this authority, because the final judgment does not make any findings regarding appellant’s inability to be present, it should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions that it specifically add…
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Conner v. Conner, 590 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ment of Corrections; [*514] whether oral argument is generally accorded others without motion; the impact of court-ordered transportation and lodging on the state and sheriff; and any other relevant factors. Brown v. Sheriff of Broward County Jail, 502 So. 2d 88, 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Moreover, as alternatives to ordering an inmate’s physical presence at a proceeding, the trial court may properly consider conducting the hearing by telephone, or permitting the taking of the inmate’s deposition pursuant to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (U.S. 1948)
- Earnest Eugene Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972)