BERNICE GRIFFIN, APPELLANT,
v.
BRUCE EMERY GRIFFIN, APPELLEE
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In this divorce modification case, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Bernice Griffin's motion to modify rehabilitative alimony filed more than three years after the rehabilitative period expired. The court held that trial courts lack jurisdiction to modify rehabilitative alimony once the designated rehabilitation period has ended.
A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify rehabilitative alimony once the designated rehabilitation period has expired. A petition to modify rehabilitative alimony or to convert it to permanent alimony filed after the rehabilitation period is untimely and the trial court correctly dismisses it for lack of jurisdiction. The existence of executory lump sum payments cannot provide a jurisdictional basis to modify the expired rehabilitative alimony award.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a petition for modification or extension of rehabilitative alimony only if it is filed within the period of rehabilitation…
[2] A petition to modify rehabilitative alimony is untimely when filed beyond the rehabilitative period specified in the final judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a petition for modification or extension of rehabilitative alimony as long as it is filed within the period of rehabilitation provided by the final judgment”
Establishes the bright-line jurisdictional rule that modifications must occur during the rehabilitation period
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBernice and Bruce Griffin's marriage was dissolved in 1982 with a final judgment awarding lump sum alimony for five years and rehabilitative alimony f…
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PER CURIAM.
The marriage of Bernice and Bruce Griffin was dissolved in 1982. The final judgment provided for lump sum alimony payable for five years and rehabilitative alimony, for three years. That judgment was affirmed by this court in Griffin v. Griffin, 436 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In January, 1986, well after the rehabilitative period had ended, Bernice sought modification of the rehabilitative alimony. The trial court denied the motion to modify on the stated basis that it was without jurisdiction since the rehabilitative period had ended. Thereafter, Bernice sought to modify the final judgment, and the trial court again denied her motion for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
At the outset we note that, with respect to rehabilitative alimony, the final judgment provides that “the wife is awarded rehabilitative alimony ... for a total of 36 months. Prior to the expiration of said time ... an application to this Court for appropriate relief shall be entertained, and jurisdiction is reserved for that purpose.”
The essence of the wife’s argument in this case is that, because the lump sum alimony award is still executory (wife acknowledges payments on the lump sum award are current), she is somehow entitled to seek to modify the now-expired rehabilitative award or, in the alternative, to modify the final judgment to provide permanent periodic alimony. In Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this court noted that the issue of the modification of rehabilitative alimony is a jurisdictional one. We held that a “trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a petition for modification or extension of rehabilitative alimony as long as it is filed within the period of rehabilitation provided by the final judgment.” Id. at 229.
A necessary corollary to the Pujáis decision is that either a petition to modify rehabilitative alimony or a petition to modify final judgments to convert rehabilitative to permanent alimony is untimely when filed beyond the rehabilitative period.
The trial court, therefore, cor rectly concluded that it was without jurisdiction. Nor can the wife piggyback modification of rehabilitative alimony on to the still-executory, lump sum payments in an attempt to find a jurisdictional basis for the trial court to otherwise modify its final judgment. That issue was disposed of by our supreme court in Gedney v. Gedney, 117 Fla. 686, 158 So. 288 (1934) (trial court without jurisdiction to rule on certain matters in divorce suit when they were not within the purview of the matters for which the court retained jurisdiction).
The order of the trial court dismissing the wife’s petition to modify the final judgment is, accordingly,
AFFIRMED.
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Cited By
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Glover v. Houston B. Glover, Jr., 548 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…correct. The case law is very clear that a petition for modification of rehabilitative alimony must be filed before the time for making the payments expires for the trial court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues. Griffin v. Griffin, 502 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Myrick v. Myrick, 402 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Even the limited exception to that rule found in Monihon v. Monihon, 4…1 / 2
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Knapp v. Knapp, 550 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Griffin v. Griffin, 502 So. 2d 1315 (Fla.3d DCA 1987).…
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Twomey v. Twomey, 566 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…order and remand for dismissal. See section 61.14, Fla.Stat.; Wright v. Wright, 559 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Glover v. Glover, 548 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Paulk v. Paulk, 504 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Griffin v. Griffin, 502 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Pratt v. Pratt, 502 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Myrick v. Myrick, 402 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Lee v. Lee, 309 So…
Authorities Cited
- Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Mathias M. Gedney v. Gedney, 117 Fla. 686 (Fla. 1934)
- Griffin v. Griffin, 436 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)