JAMES M. HART, APPELLANT,
v.
HANDLING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INC., ITS PRESIDENT, L.D. MOHRMAN, AND ITS VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, LOU K. MOHRMAN, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1987-02-24
No. BM-64
BOOTH, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur.
502 So. 2d 1319 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Hart appeals a trial court's denial of his motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue in a tort action brought by his former employer in Duval County. The appellate court reversed, holding that venue was improper because all wrongful acts occurred in Marion County where Hart resided, and the complaint failed to allege any cause of action accruing in Duval County.


Holding

Venue was improper in Duval County. Under Florida Statutes § 47.011, actions must be brought where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where property in litigation is located. Since Hart resided in Marion County and no cause of action accrued in Duval County, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue.


Headnotes

[1] Venue is proper in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.

[2] A plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the cause of action accrued in the chosen venue if it is not the defendant's county of residence.

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Key Quotes

“Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”

Establishes the statutory framework governing venue in Florida and the three proper venues available.

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Facts & Procedural History

Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. (HSE), headquartered in Duval County, employed Hart as branch manager of its Marion County office from January 1983…

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Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Judge.

MILLS, Judge.

Hart appeals from a nonfinal order denying his motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue. We find the trial court erred in denying the motion and reverse.

Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. (HSE), is a corporation engaged in selling, renting, and servicing forklifts. Its headquarters is in Duval County. L.D. and Lou K. Mohrman are corporate officers of HSE and residents of Duval County.

HSE and the Mohrmans sued Hart in Duval County alleging various torts stemming from Hart’s conduct during and immediately after his tenure as branch manager of HSE’s Ocala office. The complaint alleged that Hart was hired by HSE in January 1983 to assist the company in opening a branch office in Marion County. It further alleged that Hart was branch manager from January 1988 until October 1985, when he opened a competing business in Ocala.

Hart responded to the complaint by filing a motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue. The motion also sought dismissal on the ground that one of the counts was improperly joined with the others. The trial court dismissed the count in question, but rejected the venue challenge.

Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. Here, it is undisputed that Hart is a resident of Marion County. There is no Duval County property in litigation. The issue, therefore, is whether a cause of action accrued in Duval County.

The complaint does not allege any wrongful acts committed in Duval County. Nor does it allege an adverse impact there. All the remaining counts refer to actions taken by Hart in Marion County. No reference is made to Duval County except in the introductory portion of the complaint where it is alleged that Hart was hired in Jacksonville to assist HSE in opening its Ocala office.

Generally, a plaintiff is not required to plead and prove venue. Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. McDaniel, 78 So. 2d 100 (Fla.1955). But if a plaintiff is to maintain his suit in a county other than that of the defendant’s residence, the complaint should circumscribe facts which bring the cause within an exception set forth in the applicable venue statute. James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).

Here, not only does the complaint show on its face that venue in Duval County is improper, but the defendant presented evidence at the hearing on the motion that no cause of action accrued in Duval County. The plaintiffs failed to present evidence to the contrary. Under such circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion challenging venue.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to grant the motion as it pertains to venue.

BOOTH, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Clarke v. Cartee, 549 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
    …should circumscribe facts which bring the causé within an exception set forth in the applicable venue [*724] statute. James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Company, 238 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). Hart v. Handling Systems Engineering, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1319, 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The exception provided in section 47.011 is that venue may also lie where the cause of action accrued. Appellees’ complaint does not set forth facts establishing the requisite exception, i.e. that the cause of action accru…
  • Roberts v. Cason, 652 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …y shot his arrow into the air in Bro-ward County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to earth in Dade. It is therefore here that he must answer for his asserted error. . Compare this case with Hart v. Handling Systems Engineering, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), in which the court reversed a trial court’s order denying a change of venue: Generally, a plaintiff is not required to plead and prove venue. (Citation omitted). But if a plaintiff is to maintain his suit in a county other than…
    1 / 2
  • Timpano v. Silverman, 539 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
    …unty, and that all times material to the action, the appellant resided in Orange County. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued an order denying the motion without explanation. [*573] In Hart v. Handling Systems Engineering, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1st. DCA 1987), this court held that in order to maintain suit in a county other than that of the defendant’s residence, the complaint should “circumscribe facts” which bring the cause within one of the permissible venue provisions set forth i…

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