UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
NORMAN LEON VROMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

9th Cir. | 1993-06-30
No. 92-10437
Before: GOODWIN, NORRIS, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
997 F.2d 627 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1993)

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Holding

The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion because it was filed after a notice of appeal had already been lodged.


Facts & Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of tax violations and sentenced to imprisonment followed by probation. While his direct appeal was pending, he filed a mot…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

Norman Vroman appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of the court’s initial denial of his motion “to modify and terminate” probation. See United States v. Vroman, 795 F.Supp. 324 (N.D.Cal.1992), We vacate the district court’s judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction over Vroman’s motion.

Vroman was convicted by a jury of five counts of willfully failing to file tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, and was sentenced to 17 months imprisonment to be followed by five.years of probation. He immediately filed a notice of appeal, stating that he was appealing his conviction and sentence. Vroman did not challenge his sentence in his direct appeal. See United States v. Vroman, 975 F. 2d 669 (9th Cir.1992). In fact, Vroman did not even object to the imposition of probation at sentencing. Later, however, he chose to file a motion “to modify and terminate probation” while his direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending.

The district court entertained but denied this motion, as well as Vroman’s motion for reconsideration. In denying Vroman’s motions, the district court refused to follow language from United States v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 677 F. 2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.1982) indicating that defendants generally have the right to refuse probation and elect a sentence of imprisonment; instead, the district court relied upon United States v. Thomas, 934 F. 2d 840 (7th Cir.1991), which held that convicted defendants do not have such a right. Vroman now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.

The district court was without jurisdiction to respond to Vroman’s motion for reconsideration because he filed it after having filed a notice of appeal. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (filing of notice of appeal “divests the district court of its control over the aspects of the case involved in the appeal”); see also United States v. Ortega-Lopez, 988 F. 2d 70, 71 (9th Cir.1993) (“district court is divested of jurisdiction once a notice of appeal has been filed from the original sentence”).

The district court’s judgment is therefore VACATED.


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