CORAL MATTOS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Coral Mattos appealed the imposition of certain costs in her probation sentence following a welfare fraud conviction. The court struck costs assessed under section 960.20 due to lack of adequate notice and struck $200 in court costs under section 27.3455 as an unconstitutional ex post facto law, while affirming the probation sentence in all other respects.
The court struck the costs assessed under section 960.20 because the appellant was not given adequate notice of the assessment. The court also struck the $200 in court costs under section 27.3455 because imposition of costs under a statute that became effective after the crime was committed violated ex post facto restrictions in the U.S. and Florida Constitutions.
[1] A trial court may not assess costs against an insolvent defendant without providing adequate notice of the assessment.
[2] A trial court may not impose court costs pursuant to a statute that became effective after the commission of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, as such…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After adjudging the appellant insolvent, the trial court assessed costs against her pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1981). Since the appellant was adjudged insolvent but was not given adequate notice of the assessment, we hereby strike those costs.”
Establishes that adequate notice is required before costs can be assessed against an insolvent defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCoral Mattos was convicted of welfare fraud, a crime occurring between February 3, 1982, and April 30, 1982. The trial court adjudged her insolvent bu…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Coral Mattos, appeals that portion of an order placing her on probation which imposes certain costs against her. After reviewing the briefs and record on appeal, we agree the trial court erred in assessing these costs.
After adjudging the appellant insolvent, the trial court assessed costs against her pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1981). Since the appellant was adjudged insolvent but was not given adequate notice of the assessment, we hereby strike those costs. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). This decision is without prejudice to the trial court assessing those costs against the appellant in accordance with the requirements of Jenkins.
We also find error in the imposition of $200 additional court costs pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985). The information charged that the appellant’s crime of welfare fraud, a violation of section 409.325, Florida Statutes (1981), occurred between February 3,1982, and April 30, 1982. Section 27.3455 became effective July 1, 1985. We, therefore, hold that the trial court’s imposition of court costs pursuant to this section violated constitutional ex post facto restrictions. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1; Fla. Const. art. I, § 10; Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); see also, Yost v. State, 489 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
We, accordingly, strike that portion of the order imposing $200 court costs against the appellant pursuant to section 27.3455 and certify the same question to the supreme court that we certified in Bowman.
We find no merit in the appellant’s other contentions and, therefore, affirm the trial court in all other respects.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
SCHOONOVER and SANDERLIN, JJ., concur. RYDER, A.C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur with the result of this panel, but incorporate by reference my specially concurring opinion in Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), as to the ex post facto argument concerning section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Yost v. State, 489 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Bowman v. State, 495 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)