CABANA KEY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION

v.

CATHERINE ANN SCHOFIELD, CARMEN MALINAS, KEVIN GUFFEE, JILL BLASE, PATRICIA MCGINLAY, TED RAUKTIS, WORLD OF HOMES, TIFFANY CASTILLE AND BUILDING EMTS, LLC F/K/A E.M.T.S. OF LAKE MARY, LLC

EVANDER, C.J.

In February 2016, a fire originating in a neighboring unit caused damage to the condominium unit owned by Appellee, Catherine Ann Schofield. Pursuant to the Declaration of Condominium, Appellant, Cabana Key Condominium Association (“Association”), had a duty to promptly repair the shell and infrastructure of Schofield’s unit and to maintain and protect the unit during the repairs. When Association failed to fulfill its duties, Schofield filed an action seeking both damages and specific performance.

Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Schofield on her specific performance count. The trial court’s order further required Association to “resume and complete the repairs and replacement to the shell and infrastructure to the subject property while maintaining it and protecting it . . . within a reasonable period of time . . . .” Association appeals this nonfinal order, correctly asserting that this court has jurisdiction because the order grants injunctive relief.1 Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

On appeal, Association argues that the injunction cannot stand because the trial court erred in granting Schofield’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree. The pleadings and affidavits before the trial court firmly supported its conclusion that Association had failed to meet its obligations under the Declaration of Condominium and that summary judgment was not precluded by Association’s asserted affirmative defenses. 1 We treat the trial court’s order as granting a permanent injunction—having been entered in conjunction with the granting of summary judgment on Schofield’s count for specific performance. See Hasley v. Harrell, 971 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“[T]he pendency of the remaining interrelated claims simply made the court’s order nonfinal for purposes of appeal. In every other respect the order was in the nature of a permanent injunction.”). 2 The trial court also correctly determined that Schofield had satisfied the requirements to obtain a mandatory injunction. Section 718.303(1), Florida Statutes (2015), expressly authorizes injunctive relief in cases brought by unit owners against condominium associations for their failure to perform obligations required by the condominium documents. See also Amelio v. Marilyn Pines Unit II Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 173 So. 3d 1037, 1040-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding that condominium unit owner had satisfied requirements to obtain mandatory injunction against condominium association where association had failed to perform its obligations to maintain and repair slab on which owner’s unit sat, rendering unit uninhabitable as result of ongoing and excessive moisture intrusion).

However, we agree with Association that the trial court’s injunction order was facially defective because it failed to specify the reasons for entry of the injunction, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c). Kirkland v. PeoplesSouth Bank, 70 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“Where a trial court fails to include specific reasons for issuing an injunction, the reviewing court must reverse.”). On remand, the trial court is directed to enter an order delineating the required factual findings.

AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED with instructions.

ORFINGER and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 3