ERICA JILL NEGEDLY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GREGORY DEAN SMITH
v.
MARY E. SMITH
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In this probate case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of medical expenses to the estate's appellee, finding that the trial court improperly relied on unadmitted evidence (a rehabilitation center's billing history) to determine the full amount of medical expenses owed, when only competent evidence supported a $15,000 payment.
The court reversed the award of medical expenses, holding that competent, substantial evidence did not support the trial court's reliance on the rehabilitation center's billing history, which had not been admitted into evidence. The only competent evidence of the amount of medical expenses was Appellee's testimony and the properly admitted mediated settlement agreement, both of which supported only a $15,000 award.
[1] A trial court's findings in a probate matter will not be disturbed if supported by competent, substantial evidence.
[2] A party seeking reimbursement for medical expenses from an estate may only recover the amount actually paid or incurred, not the full amount of the original bill if a set…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This Court will not disturb a trial court's findings in a probate matter so long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence.”
Establishes the standard of review applicable to probate findings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Mary E. Smith entered into a payor agreement with a rehabilitation center for Gregory Dean Smith's care. Following Mr. Smith's death, the reh…
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PER CURIAM.
In this probate case, Appellant challenges a final order awarding funeral and medical expenses to Appellee. We agree with Appellant that the amount of medical expenses awarded to Appellee was not supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we reverse as to this issue but affirm in all other respects.
Appellee entered into a payor agreement with a rehabilitation center for the care of Gregory Smith. Following Mr. Smith’s death, the rehabilitation center sought to enforce the agreement by suing Appellee for unpaid medical expenses. Ultimately, the rehabilitation center settled the claim with Appellee for $15,000. As part of the mediated settlement agreement, the rehabilitation center assigned its claim to Appellee.
Subsequently, Appellee filed a claim with the estate of Mr. Smith, seeking reimbursement for the full amount of medical expenses incurred by the rehabilitation center. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Appellee was entitled, under the assignment, to recover the total amount of the rehabilitation center’s claim for Mr. Smith’s medical care. The trial court then entered an order reflecting the total amount of medical expenses as detailed in the rehabilitation center’s billing history attached to Appellee’s complaint. This appeal timely followed.
This Court will not disturb a trial court’s findings in a probate matter so long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Lurio v. Lurio By and Through Rosenthal, 443 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (citing In re Yost's Estate, 117 So. 2d 753, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)). Appellant argues that competent, substantial evidence does not support the amount of medical expenses awarded to Appellee. We agree.
Here, although the trial court properly analyzed Appellee’s claims pursuant to section 733.707(1)(d) and (h), Florida Statutes (2018), it erroneously relied on the rehabilitation center’s billing history, which had not been admitted into evidence. The only evidence as to the amount of medical expenses consisted of Appellee’s testimony that she resolved the rehabilitation center’s claim for $15,000 and the properly admitted 2 mediated settlement agreement. However, this evidence only supported Appellee’s payment of $15,000 in medical expenses.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an amended order reducing the award of medical expenses to $15,000. 1 AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for further proceedings.
WALLIS, HARRIS and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 1 The trial court also relied on the rehabilitation center’s billing history to establish the dates the medical expenses were incurred. As that evidence was not properly admitted, Appellee’s claim for $15,000 should be categorized as a Class 8 claim pursuant to section 733.707(1)(d) and (h). 3
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- In re Est. of Minerva J. G. Yost v. Magee, 117 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Lurio v. Lurio, 443 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)