J.N.
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
J.N. appealed a Department of Children and Families decision denying her Medicaid Institutional Care Program (ICP) benefits based on a finding that she transferred $100,000 to an investment entity for less than fair market value with the sole purpose of becoming Medicaid-eligible. The appellate court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Department's determination that J.N. could not receive fair market value from her investment given her limited life expectancy and lack of control over or guaranteed return of her principal.
The court affirmed that J.N. is ineligible for Medicaid ICP benefits because substantial, competent evidence supports the Department's finding that she did not intend to receive fair market value for her investment. The court concluded that J.N.'s modest monthly interest payments would not constitute fair market value given her 5.87-year life expectancy, and her lack of any guaranteed right to recover her principal during her lifetime renders the investment incapable of producing fair market value.
[1] A transfer of assets for less than fair market value, made with the sole purpose of qualifying for Medicaid Institutional Care Program benefits, can result in a penalty p…
[2] An investment is not considered to be for fair market value if the recipient cannot sell or borrow against their interest and will not receive the return of their investm…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“J.N. conceded below and on appeal that she invested in Coastal for the sole purpose of becoming eligible for Medicaid. However, she argues, inter alia, that she nevertheless remains eligible for medical assistance because she intended to receive fair market value for her investment.”
Establishes that while J.N. admitted the improper purpose, she argued the investment should still qualify as fair market value, which the court rejected.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.N. invested $100,000 in Coastal Income Properties–Zachary Taylor, LLC (Coastal) and conceded that her sole purpose was to become eligible for Medica…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fair Market Value cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, J.N., appeals the Department of Children and Families’ (the “Department”) order imposing a penalty that denied Medicaid Institutional Care Program (“Medicaid ICP”) benefits to Appellant from November 2017 through September 2018, based on its determination that Appellant transferred $100,000 to Coastal Income Properties–Zachary Taylor, LLC (“Coastal”) in exchange for an interest in Coastal for less than fair market value for the sole purpose of attempting to become eligible for the Medicaid ICP. We affirm.
J.N. conceded below and on appeal that she invested in Coastal for the sole purpose of becoming eligible for Medicaid. However, she argues, inter alia, that she nevertheless remains eligible for medical assistance because she intended to receive fair market value for her investment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C); Fla. Admin. Code R. 65A-1.712(3). We disagree because the hearing officer’s conclusion to the contrary is supported by substantial, competent evidence.
The record evidence is undisputed that J.N. is prohibited from transferring or selling any of her interest in Coastal. Nor can J.N. borrow against her interest. While J.N. receives $333.33 in monthly interest payments, the parties agree that her remaining life expectancy at the time of the investment was only 5.87 years. Fla. Admin. Code R. 65A-1.712(3)(b), 65A-1.716. Therefore, the record conclusively establishes that J.N. will not receive fair market value from this modest monthly interest payment, by itself, given her life expectancy.
Importantly, J.N. also has no right to a return of her investment within her lifetime.
In the proceeding below, J.N. was co-represented by Aaron Ray, who is also an agent of Coastal. During his testimony, Mr. Ray took the position that J.N. will receive her investment back upon “maturity,” which is within five to seven years, and J.N.’s counsel maintains this position on appeal. This argument is disingenuous. 2 Indeed, the investment’s governing documents expressly provide that “maturity” is at the sole discretion of the managers. The five to seven-year window is, in essence, no more than an aspirational goal or estimation that can be changed or ignored by Coastal’s managers without recourse for J.N. In short, the governing documents allow Coastal to keep J.N.’s investment until her death and provide no right for J.N. to recover the investment during her lifetime.
Accordingly, based upon the record evidence and all permissible inferences, the Department’s conclusion that J.N. transferred $100,000 in cash to Coastal but did not intend to do so in exchange for fair market value was supported by substantial, competent evidence.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, EISNAUGLE, and TRAVER, JJ., concur. 3