SPECIALTY SOLUTIONS, INC.

v.

BAXTER GYPSUM & CONCRETE, LLC

GROSSHANS, J.

Specialty Solutions, Inc. (SSI) appeals the order denying its motion to vacate the amended final judgment entered in favor of Baxter Gypsum & Concrete, LLC (Baxter).

We agree, in part, with SSI, and hold that the amended final judgment is void as it pertains to the award of unliquidated damages. In all other respects, we affirm.

Baxter sued SSI and others, seeking an injunction and an unspecified amount of damages. When SSI failed to respond to the complaint, the clerk entered a default against SSI, and the trial court subsequently entered a default final judgment in favor of Baxter. Baxter then filed a motion for summary judgment. Relying on an affidavit, Baxter asserted entitlement to $817,465 in damages. Baxter filed a notice of hearing and, twentyfour days later, the trial court held the summary judgment hearing. However, SSI did not appear. Following the hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment, awarded Baxter the requested damages, and amended the final judgment to include the damages.

Over a month later, SSI filed a motion seeking relief from the amended final judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4). Among other things, SSI argued that the trial court violated its due process rights by awarding unliquidated damages without an evidentiary hearing or trial on damages and without sufficient notice.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court found that SSI had not shown excusable neglect or a meritorious defense—two showings which it deemed necessary to support the relief requested by SSI. This appeal timely followed.

In this appeal, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the facts and its ultimate determination on whether the challenged order was void.

See Schmidt v. Nipper, 287 So. 3d 1289, 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020); Wiggins v. Tigrent, Inc., 147 So. 3d 76, 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). “It is well settled that ‘[a] default admits a plaintiff’s entitlement to liquidated damages under a well-pled cause of action, but not to unliquidated damages absent proper notice and a trial on damages.’” Ciprian-Escapa v. City of Orlando, 172 So. 3d 485, 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting Bodygear Activewear, Inc. v. Counter Intelligence 2 Servs., 946 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Further, a judgment rendered without a trial on unliquidated damages is void as to any unliquidated damages but valid as to any liquidated damages. See id. at 488–89 (citing BOYI, LLC v. Premiere Am. Bank, N.A., 127 So. 3d 850, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Cellular Warehouse, Inc. v. GH Cellular, LLC, 957 So. 2d 662, 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)).

Here, as Baxter concedes, the damages awarded were not liquidated. Thus, due process required the court to hold a trial or evidentiary hearing, after proper notice, to determine the amount of damages. See Bodygear Activewear, 946 So. 2d at 1150−51; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.440(c). However, the court did not do so.

Although acknowledging these facts, Baxter asserts that SSI’s knowledge of the summary judgment proceedings ameliorates any due process concerns associated with the court’s failure to hold a trial or evidentiary hearing. In making this claim, Baxter relies on Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1990), which held that irregularities in the mode of a proceeding did not necessarily render a judgment void for lack of due process when the parties had knowledge of the proceeding and actively participated in it. Id. at 444−45. However, as SSI correctly argues, no trial or evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of unliquidated damages. Thus, the error in this case does not simply relate to the mode of a necessary proceeding. Rather, a necessary proceeding was entirely omitted.

See Lauxmont Farms, Inc. v. Flavin, 514 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (holding that summary judgment was not a valid substitute for an evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages). Thus, Baxter’s reliance on Curbelo is misplaced.

Accordingly, we reverse the amended final judgment as to the award of unliquidated damages but do not otherwise disturb that judgment. To the extent the order 3 denying relief from the amended final judgment is inconsistent with this holding, we reverse it also. Affirming in all other respects, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with instructions.

COHEN and HARRIS, JJ., concur. 4