JESUS JACQUES-MERAZ AND DEBBIE JACQUES-MERAZ
v.
DEBRA WALKER
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Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to overturn a circuit court's denial of appellate attorney's fees after successfully defending against an eviction action in county court. The District Court of Appeal held that the prevailing defendants were entitled to attorney's fees under the contract's fee provision and applicable Florida statutes, and granted the petition.
Petitioners are entitled to appellate attorney's fees because the availability of attorney's fees is determined by the cause of action asserted in the complaint, not the disposition of the case. Since the contract was not found unenforceable, the eviction and breach of lease claims were within the scope of the attorney's fees provision, and Petitioners prevailed in both the county and circuit courts, they are entitled to fees under section 57.105(7).
[1] A party who prevails in defending against claims arising from a lease and purchase option agreement is entitled to appellate attorney's fees if the agreement contains an…
[2] The availability of attorney's fees is determined by the cause of action asserted in the complaint, not solely by the ultimate disposition of the case.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the availability of attorney's fees was determined by the cause of action asserted in Appellees' complaint, not the disposition of the case. Provided that the contract is not found to be unenforceable between the parties, if a claim is within the scope of an attorney's fees provision, the party defending against that claim is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(7) if the party prevails.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that attorney's fees availability depends on the claims asserted, not case disposition
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondent sued Petitioners in county court for eviction based on failure to pay rent and non-compliance with a Lease and Purchase Option agreement. P…
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Debra Walker, Osteen, pro se.
WALLIS, J.
Petitioners seek a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and request that we quash an order from the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, denying their motion for appellate attorney's fees following Respondent's unsuccessful appeal originating in the county court. We grant the petition.
Respondent originally sued Petitioners in county court, seeking an eviction for failure to pay rent as well as non-compliance with the terms of a Lease and Purchase Option agreement. The Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the lease was essentially a contract for a deed and the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional limits. The county court granted the motion and Respondent appealed the dismissal to the circuit court. During that appeal,
Petitioners moved for appellate attorney's fees citing to the agreement that was attached to the complaint and to sections 57.105(7), 59.46, and 83.48, Florida Statutes (2019).
The circuit court affirmed the county court's dismissal but denied the Petitioners' motion for appellate attorney's fees, concluding that because there was no eviction proceeding, there was no basis for fees.
We review a decision issued by a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity to determine whether the circuit court afforded the parties procedural due process and whether the essential requirements of the law were observed. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest v. O’Connor, 855 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Ivey v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 774 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2000), and Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Whitley, 846 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). The instant petition is entirely directed at the circuit court's denial of Petitioners' motion for appellate attorney's fees. Petitioners argue, essentially, that the circuit court applied the wrong law because they are entitled to fees as the prevailing party in the county court pursuant to sections 57.105(7) and 59.46. Our Court has previously held that: the availability of attorney's fees was determined by the cause of action asserted in Appellees' complaint, not the disposition of the case. Provided that the contract is not found to be unenforceable between the parties, if a claim is within the scope of an attorney's fees provision, the party defending against that claim is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(7) if the party prevails. 2 CalAtlantic Grp., Inc. v. Dau, 268 So. 3d 265, 268–69 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
In the present case, the contract was not found unenforceable, the eviction and breach of lease agreement claims in the complaint were within the scope of the attorney's fees provision contained in the agreement, and the Petitioners succeeded in both the county and the circuit courts. Therefore, the Petitioners are entitled to fees. See id.
PETITION GRANTED.
HARRIS and TRAVER, JJ., concur. 3
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Farren Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Whitley, 846 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Hartford Ins. Co. OF THE Midwest v. O'Connor, 855 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Calatlantic Grp., Inc. v. Dau, 268 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)