TRAVIS CAMPBELL
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Travis Campbell appealed a trial court order that terminated his felony probation unsatisfactorily and required him to pay $100 per week in restitution for ten years. The appellate court affirmed the unsatisfactory termination but reversed the restitution schedule, holding that courts lack authority to impose restitution terms that extend beyond the probation period.
The trial court lacks authority to set a restitution schedule that extends beyond the probation period. However, the trial court retains authority to reduce the outstanding restitution amount to a civil lien.
“The court may require that the defendant make restitution under this section within a specified period or in specified installments but [t]he end of such period or the last such installment shall not be later than . . . [t]he end of the period of probation if probation is ordered.”
Establishes the statutory limit on restitution terms—they cannot extend beyond probation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCampbell was on felony probation with restitution as a probation condition. The trial court terminated his probation unsatisfactorily and attempted to…
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PER CURIAM.
Travis Campbell appeals an order that: 1) terminated his felony probation unsatisfactorily, and 2) required him to pay the balance of his restitution obligation in the amount of $100 per week for the next ten years. Campbell’s obligation to pay restitution had been a condition of his probation.
We affirm, without discussion, the trial court’s determination that Campbell completed his probationary term in an unsatisfactory manner. However, we agree that the trial court lacked authority to set a restitution schedule after it terminated Campbell’s probation. See § 775.089(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The court may require that the defendant make restitution under this section within a specified period or in specified installments” but “[t]he end of such period or the last such installment shall not be later than . . . [t]he end of the period of probation if probation is ordered.”). As acknowledged by both the State and Campbell, the trial court does have the authority to reduce the outstanding restitution amount to a civil lien. § 775.089(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2019).
AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED.
EVANDER, C.J., ORFINGER and TRAVER, JJ., concur. 2