CHRISTOPHER M. BRYANT
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Christopher Bryant appealed a trial court's partial denial of his motion to correct sentence, arguing the court erred in revoking his sex offender probation and imposing a nine-year sentence. The appellate court affirmed the sentence, rejecting Bryant's argument that he did not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern, finding that the trial court's record did not actually reflect such a designation.
The court affirmed the sentence. Although Bryant does not qualify as a VFOSC, the record refutes his claim that the trial court made such a designation. Additionally, the trial court did not err in failing to consider alternative sanctions because Bryant's probation officer elected not to recommend alternative sanctioning and instead filed an affidavit of violation, which renders alternative sanctions inapplicable.
[1] A defendant cannot be designated a violent felony offender of special concern if they have not been previously convicted of a qualifying offense.
[2] A trial court's denial of a motion to correct sentence will be affirmed if the record refutes the defendant's claim that the court made a specific sentencing designation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While we agree that Bryant does not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern, we nonetheless affirm because the record refutes his claim that the trial court made such a designation.”
Establishes that the court agreed with Bryant's substantive legal argument but affirmed on the narrower ground that the trial court did not actually make the designation Bryant challenged.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBryant had his sex offender probation revoked and received a nine-year sentence. He filed a motion to correct sentence challenging the revocation. Bry…
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PER CURIAM.
Christopher Bryant appeals the trial court’s partial denial of his motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).
Bryant argues that the trial court erred in denying, in part, his motion to correct sentence because it revoked his sex offender probation and imposed a nine-year sentence on the basis that he qualified as a violent felony offender of special concern under section 948.06(8), Florida Statutes (2019).
He contends that because he had not been previously convicted of a qualifying offense, he could not have been considered a violent felony offender of special concern for purposes of sentencing.
While we agree that Bryant does not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern, we nonetheless affirm because the record refutes his claim that the trial court made such a designation.
Bryant also contends that because his probation violations were “technical” and “low risk,” the trial court erred in failing to consider alternative sanctions under section under section 948.06(9). However, the record reveals that Bryant’s probation officer elected not to recommend alternative sanctioning. See § 948.06(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Instead, based on the circumstances of Bryant’s probation violations, the probation officer filed an 2 affidavit of violation of probation, thereby rendering alternative sanctions inapplicable to Bryant’s case. See § 948.06(1)(c), (9)(a), Fla. Stat. AFFIRMED.
EVANDER, C.J., and COHEN, J., concur. EISNAUGLE, J., concurs, and concurs specially with opinion. 3 CASE NO. 5D19-3396 EISNAUGLE, J., concurring specially.
I agree that Bryant’s judgment and sentence must be affirmed.
However, I would not reach the merits of Bryant’s argument that he does not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern (“VFOSC”) because, as the majority notes, the trial court did not designate Bryant as a VFOSC. 4