SARAH BILBY

v.

AUSTIN WILSON

WALLIS, J.

Sarah Bilby appeals the Final Judgment of Injunction for protection against stalking entered against her. She argues that the trial court erred in entering the injunction because Austin Wilson failed to present competent, substantial evidence of emotional distress. We agree and reverse.

This case arose from an online romantic relationship between Bilby and Wilson that lasted more than one year. Wilson was the only witness to testify at the evidentiary hearing. According to his testimony, his relationship with Bilby was limited to communicating through regular phone calls and a social media application called Line. After the parties agreed to end the relationship, Wilson "blocked" Bilby from his social media account to prevent Bilby from contacting him. Thereafter, Bilby allegedly created fake social media accounts and posted information that was purportedly damaging to Wilson's reputation. Eventually, Bilby directed her social media attacks at Wilson’s new girlfriend, contacted his employer and relayed damaging information, filed police reports falsely accusing Wilson of stalking, and sent a third person to his residence on her behalf. Wilson admitted that he did not face any repercussions at work. After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered an injunction against Bilby based on section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2020).

Section 784.048(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2020), defines cyberstalking as the act of engaging in a "course of conduct to communicate, or cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of 2 electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person" which causes "substantial emotional distress" and serves "no legitimate purpose." The substantial emotional distress required to support an injunction is greater than ordinary distress or embarrassment. Craft v. Fuller, 298 So. 3d 99, 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). "In the context of a petition for injunction against cyberstalking, the question of '[w]hether a communication causes substantial emotional distress should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person standard.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum, 191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)).

Although Wilson testified that he and Bilby often argued during the course of their relationship and that Bilby threatened to self-harm, he clarified that Bilby never threatened him with violence. Indeed, Wilson testified that when Bilby began posting about him on social media, he "ignored her for some time hoping she would . . . let her frustrations out and just be done."

This testimony and Wilson's admission that he did not face repercussions at work are insufficient to establish that a reasonable person would sustain substantial emotional distress. At most, Wilson's testimony established that Bilby's public posts were damaging to his reputation.

However, this is insufficient to support the entry of an injunction against stalking. See Scott, 191 So. 3d at 505 (holding that substantial emotional distress requirement 3 was not met even when evidence showed that Scott sent derogatory and damaging emails about Blum to Blum's colleagues and Blum testified that he sustained emotional distress, and had trouble sleeping and eating; "That the articles written by Mr. Scott contain false allegations or embarrassing information is not a basis for a cyberstalking injunction"); Leach v. Kersey, 162 So. 3d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding that Leach's action of contacting Kersey through telephone, messages, and Facebook to scorn Kersey about her affair with Leach's husband would not cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person).

Therefore, Wilson's failure to meet this element requires reversal. See Roach v. Brower, 180 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding that the trial court erred in entering an injunction against Roach where Brower did not present testimony or other evidence showing whether Roach's repeated attempts of contacting Brower caused Brower substantial emotional distress).

Accordingly, because competent, substantial evidence does not support the Final Judgment of Injunction, we reverse with directions to dismiss the petition.

REVERSED and REMANDED with Instructions.

EISNAUGLE and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur. 4