CATHERINE M. WARD, APPELLANT,
v.
MAUREEN YOUNG, INDIVIDUALLY, TERRY ALAN SWINDLE, INDIVIDUALLY, JOSE MIRET, INDIVIDUALLY, LUISA MIRET, INDIVIDUALLY, AND CHRISTINA MIRET, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ward was bitten by a pit bull owned by a tenant on property leased from the Mirets. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Mirets, but the appellate court reversed, holding that under Noble v. Yorke, a dog-bite victim may sue a non-owner landlord on a common law liability theory, and unresolved factual questions precluded summary judgment.
A dog-bite victim may pursue a non-owner landlord on a common law liability claim. Summary judgment for the Mirets was improper because multiple factual questions remained unresolved, including whether Marra was acting as the Mirets' agent, whether his knowledge was imputable to them, whether the bite occurred on the Mirets' property, and what Ward's status was on the premises.
[1] A dog bite victim may pursue a common law liability claim against the non-owner of a dog.
[2] Compliance with statutory provisions insulating a dog owner from liability does not extinguish the possibility of pursuing a non-owner linked to the dog.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the victim may pursue the non-owner upon a common law liability claim”
Establishes the primary legal principle that dog-bite liability extends beyond the dog's owner to non-owners under common law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung, a tenant on property leased from the Mirets, obtained a pit bull from her boyfriend Swindle following a burglary-related anxiety. The Mirets' c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Imputation Of Agent'S Knowledge To Principal cases and more on FLexlaw
FRANK, Judge.
The appellant, Ward, was bitten by a dog owned by Young and Swindle, occupants of property Young leased from the Mirets. The trial court terminated Ward’s action against the Mirets by granting a motion for summary judgment. Ward appealed and we reverse.
During Young’s tenancy, she experienced a burglary resulting in the loss of personal property. Because of anxiety stemming from the break-in, Young wanted a dog and her boyfriend, Swindle, gave her a pit bull. It appears that the Mirets’ cousin, Marra, who collected the rents, knew of the dog’s presence on the property, but it is disputed that he approved having it there. In any event, Ward was attacked and severely injured by the dog when passing in proximity to the point where the dog’s reach was limited by a chain restraining it. Signs were posted on the property warning of the dog’s presence.
Our supreme court’s recent decision in Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29 (Fla.1986), lays to rest any uncertainty that may have existed entitling a dog-bite victim to sue the non-owner of a dog — the victim may pursue the non-owner upon a common law liability claim. Id. at 31. The insulation from dog bite liability provided a dog owner through compliance with section 767.04, Florida Statutes (1986), does not extinguish the possibility of pursuing the non-owner who can be linked to the dog. We find that granting summary judgment in favor of the Mirets was mistaken; several questions of fact remain for resolution upon a trial.
The record discloses that Marra knew of the dog’s presence on the property and the purpose for which it was procured — to guard Young from intruders and to protect her against a repeat burglary. In this setting, two questions emerge, i.e., did Marra occupy the status of an agent acting on behalf of the Mirets, and, if so, is his knowledge of the dog’s presence at the premises and its propensities imputable to the Mirets. Another question, wholly unanswered in the record, is whether the biting occurred on or beyond the Mirets property. See Anderson v. Waltkal, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). If, of course, the unfortunate attack took place somewhere other than on the Mirets’ property, they cannot be held responsible for Wards’ injuries. Id. at pp. 294-295. On the other hand, if the event happened on the Mirets’ property, there is the question of Ward’s status which can only be answered by determining why she was there and for what purpose. In short, the questions of fact we distill from the scant record before us require that we vacate the summary judgment and remand this matter for the trial of all issues.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F. (Ret.), J„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Vasques v. Marcelino Lopez, 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…irect knowledge that a vicious dog was kept on the premises, and that the premises were under the tenant’s control. Appellant asserts that, based upon the evidence, a jury could infer actual knowledge on the part of the landlord. See Ward v. Young, 504 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Appellant further asserts that because the tenants could be lawfully evicted at will, the landlord had sufficient control over the premises to be liable for the dangerous c…
-
Ny Tran v. Bancroft, 648 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…pubhc street and attacked a motorcyclist. The court held that the landlord was not responsible for the attack by the tenant’s dog that occurred (1) outside the leased premises and (2) on property not owned by the landlord. Id. Accord, Ward v. Young, 504 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (landowner “cannot be held responsible” for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog that occur somewhere other than the landowners property); see also, O’Steen v. Kemmerer, 344 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (absent some special in…
-
State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…by pit bulls have been chronicled in the Southern Reporter. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Stuart, 468 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1985); Vasques v. Lopez, 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); White v. Whitworth, 509 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Ward v. Young, 504 So. 2d 528 (Fla.2d DCA 1987); Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Manucy v. Manucy, 362 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Pit bulls have even been considered weapons in first-degree assaults. See State v. Livingston, 420 N.W. 2d 223 (Minn.Ct…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1986)
- Seneca B. Anderson and Martha P. Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- City OF W. Palm Beach v. Lipkin, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)