KAREN MOODY-ALCHIN, AS A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF URSULA PENLAND
v.
THERESA BARTON, GUARDIAN
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A personal representative of a deceased ward's estate appealed summary judgment that barred her claims against the former guardian based on res judicata. The court reversed the summary judgment as to fraud-based claims, finding the claims in the guardianship objection were not identical to the fraud claims in the subsequent lawsuit, thus failing a key element of res judicata.
The court reversed summary judgment as to the fraud-based portions of Moody-Alchin's claims, including breach of fiduciary duty claims based on fraud, because the thing sued for in the objection (production of documents) was not identical to the thing sued for in the fraud claims. The court otherwise affirmed the summary judgment on the remaining claims.
[1] Res judicata requires identity of the thing sued for, the cause of action, the persons and parties, and the quality or capacity of the persons for or against whom the cla…
[2] A prior objection seeking document production in a guardianship proceeding does not, by res judicata, bar subsequent fraud claims if the 'thing sued for' is not the same.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“for res judicata to bar a subsequent action, four identities must be present: 1) identity of the thing sued for[;] 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of persons and parties; and 4) identity of the quality or capacity of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”
Establishes the four-part test for res judicata that the court applied in analyzing whether Moody-Alchin's claims were barred.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUrsula Penland was under guardianship supervised by Theresa Barton. During the guardianship proceeding, Moody-Alchin filed an objection to Barton's mo…
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PER CURIAM.
Karen Moody-Alchin, as personal representative of the estate of Ursula Penland, appeals a final summary judgment finding that Moody-Alchin’s various claims against Theresa Barton, as the decedent’s guardian prior to her death, are barred by res judicata. We reverse the summary judgment as to the portions of Moody-Alchin’s claims based on fraud. We otherwise affirm without further discussion.
In her motion for summary judgment, Barton argued that Moody-Alchin’s claims are barred by res judicata because, during the guardianship proceeding, Moody-Alchin filed an objection to Barton’s motion for discharge.
While Moody-Alchin’s objection sought the production of documents, it also opined, given the amount spent and relatively short amount of time, that Barton “recklessly managed and potentially dissipated this Guardianship Estate.” The trial court agreed with Barton and entered summary judgment in her favor. On appeal, Moody-Alchin argues that her claims are not barred by res judicata because, inter alia, there is no identity in the causes of action. We agree. “[F]or res judicata to bar a subsequent action, four identities must be present: 1) identity of the thing sued for[;] 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of persons and parties; and 4) identity of the quality or capacity of 2 the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” Costello v. Curtis Bldg.
P’ship, 864 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citations omitted). Here, at a minimum, we conclude that the “thing sued for” in Moody-Alchin’s objection seeking the production of documents in the guardianship proceeding is not the same as the thing sued for in the fraud claims alleged in the instant action. As such, we reverse the summary judgment as to the portions of Moody-Alchin’s claims, including the breach of fiduciary duty claim, that are based on fraud.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
LAMBERT, C.J., EISNAUGLE and TRAVER, JJ., concur. 3