LOUISE PAULK, APPELLANT,
v.
RAYBURN PAULK, APPELLEE
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A former wife appealed the dismissal of her petition to modify rehabilitative alimony, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed, holding that because the petition was filed before the rehabilitative period ended, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the modification request.
The trial court retained jurisdiction to consider the modification petition because it was filed within the rehabilitative period established by the final judgment. The rehabilitative period extended from May 1, 1984, to May 1, 1986, and since the petition was filed April 28, 1986, it was timely and within the court's jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to modify or extend rehabilitative alimony when a petition for modification is filed within the period of rehabilitation specified in t…
[2] A petition for modification of rehabilitative alimony is timely filed if it is submitted before the expiration of the rehabilitative period as defined by the final judgme…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“either party may apply to the circuit court ... for a judgment decreasing or increasing the amount of ... alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires”
The statutory basis granting courts jurisdiction to modify alimony upon changed circumstances
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' 26-year marriage was dissolved on April 9, 1984, with a final judgment awarding the wife $600 per month in rehabilitative alimony for two…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant, former wife, seeks review of an order dismissing her petition for modification of rehabilitative alimony. She contends the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. We agree, and reverse, finding that because the petition was filed before the end of the rehabilitative period specified in the final judgment of dissolution, it was timely filed, and the court had jurisdiction to consider its merits.
The parties’ marriage of 26 years was dissolved on April 9, 1984. The final judgment of dissolution awarded appellant “the sum of $600 per month as rehabilitative alimony for a period of two years. The first payment of $600 shall be due and payable on May 1, 1984, and shall continue on the first day of each month thereafter for a period of two years.” Appellant on April 28, 1986 filed a supplemental complaint for modification, alleging that because of a physical injury she was unable to work or rehabilitate herself, and requesting that rehabilitative alimony be extended, modified to permanent alimony, and increased in amount. In a June 9,1986 order, the court dismissed the supplemental complaint on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaint because the complaint was filed after the date of the last payment of rehabilitative alimony and more than two years after the date of the final judgment.
Section 61.14, Florida Statutes, provides that when a party is required by court order to make alimony payments and the circumstances of either party have changed, “either party may apply to the circuit court ... for a judgment decreasing or increasing the amount of ... alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires.” Florida courts have held that, under this provision, the trial court retains jurisdiction to modify or extend rehabilitative alimony when a petition is filed within the period of rehabilitation provided by the final judgment. Pujals v. Pujáis, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
The final judgment here stated that appellant was to receive rehabilitative alimony for a period of two years beginning May 1, 1984, and payable the first day of each month thereafter for two years. By these terms, the rehabilitative period extended from May 1, 1984, to May 1, 1986, and the trial court had jurisdiction to consider appellant’s April 28, 1986 petition.
The order is reversed.
WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Adele Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…636 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Although Former Wife waited until two months before her sixty-second birthday, her petition was filed during the alimony payment period, making it timely. See § 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) ; Paulk v. Paulk , 504 So. 2d 790, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although the payment period expired before the court ruled, we reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain and rule on the petition. Authority to Extend Duration of Alim…
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Twomey v. Twomey, 566 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ative period, we are compelled to vacate the trial court order and remand for dismissal. See section 61.14, Fla.Stat.; Wright v. Wright, 559 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Glover v. Glover, 548 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Paulk v. Paulk, 504 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Griffin v. Griffin, 502 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Pratt v. Pratt, 502 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Myrick v. Myric…
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Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Although Former Wife waited until two months before her sixty-second birthday, her petition was filed during the alimony payment period, making it timely. See § 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003); Paulk v. Paulk, 504 So. 2d 790, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although the payment period expired before the court ruled, we reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain and rule on the petition. ---PAGE 5--- Authority to Extend…
Authorities Cited
- Ranelle M. LEE v. LEE, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)