DAVID LEE MCNICKLES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Lee McNickles appeals the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police after being arrested for trafficking cocaine and possessing marijuana. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that police scrupulously honored McNickles' initial invocation of his right to remain silent by ceasing questioning, waiting 45 minutes, and obtaining a fresh Miranda waiver before resuming interrogation.
The court held that the trooper scrupulously honored McNickles' initial assertion of his right to remain silence by immediately ceasing interrogation, waiting a significant period of time (45 minutes), providing fresh Miranda warnings via a written waiver form, and obtaining McNickles' knowing and voluntary waiver before resuming questioning. Therefore, the subsequent incriminating statements were admissible.
[1] When a suspect invokes their right to remain silent, police must immediately cease questioning and may only resume interrogation after a significant period of time has pa…
[2] A suspect's subsequent review and signing of a Miranda waiver form, after initially invoking the right to remain silent, can constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a suspect asserts his right to remain silent, the police must immediately cease their questioning, and only resume interrogation after the passage of a significant period of time and the giving of fresh warnings.”
Establishes the legal standard from Michigan v. Mosley for permissible resumption of interrogation after invocation of right to silence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA state trooper stopped a vehicle in which McNickles was a passenger and discovered cocaine and marijuana during a search. After reading Miranda right…
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress statements made to the police concerning the drugs.
A trooper stopped the car in which the defendant was a passenger. After conducting a search of the vehicle, the officer discovered cocaine and marijuana. He read the car’s occupants their Miranda rights, and questioned them as to who the contraband belonged to. No one would admit to owning the drugs; everyone remained silent when questioned.
Forty-five minutes later, after being transported to a substation, the defendant was given an interview report and asked to review and sign it. The form advised the defendant of his right to remain silent and to talk to an attorney, and stated that the defendant was willing to voluntarily waive these rights. The trooper inquired if defendant had any questions, and after the defendant read and signed the form, proceeded to question him. The defendant admitted that the drugs belonged to him and that he knew of their presence in the car. The issue on appeal is whether the trooper scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to remain silent, which the latter invoked at the time the drugs were discovered by refusing to answer any questions. When a suspect asserts his right to remain silent, the police must immediately cease their questioning, and only resume interrogation after the passage of a significant period of time and the giving of fresh warnings. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Here, the defendant was not reinterrogated until after he had read and signed a waiver of rights form, 45 minutes from the time the initial questioning ceased.
In State v. Isaac, 465 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights upon arrest, and indicated a desire to remain silent. He was taken to a hospital, where an hour and a half later a detective presented him with a Miranda waiver form. The defendant read the form, said he understood it, signed it, and made inculpatory statements to the detective. The court held that the police scrupulously honored the defendant’s initial assertion of his right to remain silent, arid that the defendant later knowingly and voluntarily waived this right.
Here, the record reveals that the defendant willingly made the incriminating admissions a significant period after he initially asserted his right to remain silent, and that the trooper scrupulously honored that right. Therefore, we find no error by the trial court, and affirm the judgment below.
ANSTEAD, WALDEN and STONE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Belcher, 520 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ce sought to wear down defendant). Other courts have found periods of time ranging from less than an hour to several hours to be sufficient where the defendant was given fresh Miranda warnings and the defendant waived his rights. McNickles v. State, 505 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 4th DCA) (forty-five minutes sufficient where new warnings were given and defendant waived his rights), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla.1987); State v. Isaac, 465 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (one hour and forty minutes sufficient where def…
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State v. Chavis, 546 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…rrogation before commencing it anew. Here, [*1097] there was approximately a one and one-half hour lapse. That was slightly less than the two-hour time lapse in the Mosely case. Shorter time intervals have also passed muster. See McNickles v. State, 505 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla.1987) (45 minutes); State v. Isaac, 465 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (one hour and fifteen minutes). Further, Mosley requires that Miranda warnings must be given again before questioning renews. He…
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Wells v. State, 540 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…When the right to remain silent is asserted, the police must immediately cease their questioning and only resume interrogation after the passage of a significant period of time and the giving of fresh warnings. Id. This court in McNickles v. State, 505 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla.1987), found that an interval of forty-five minutes was a significant passage of time. In the instant case, appellant was not questioned at the scene, nor was he questioned during transport. His subse…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Deamous Isaac, 465 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)