CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
NORMAN LALIBERTY, APPELLEE
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Chrysler Credit Corporation appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss or transfer venue in a credit reporting dispute. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the plaintiff properly alleged venue in Taylor County where the cause of action arose, and Chrysler failed to meet its burden of challenging venue with affidavit or evidence.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to transfer venue. The plaintiff had the prerogative to initially select venue, and once venue was alleged in the complaint, the burden shifted to Chrysler to demonstrate improper venue by affidavit or sworn pleading with supporting evidence. Since Chrysler failed to file such documentation or present evidence that the cause of action did not arise in Taylor County, it failed to sustain its burden.
[1] A plaintiff has the initial prerogative to select venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute.
[2] When venue is alleged in the initial pleading, it is sufficient if laid in the margin, even if erroneously laid in the body of the pleading.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is the plaintiffs prerogative to initially select venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute.”
Establishes the foundational rule that plaintiffs have initial authority to choose venue
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee, a Taylor County resident, purchased a car financed through Chrysler Credit Corporation. After transferring the vehicle to a third party, it …
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SHIVERS, Judge.
The appellant in this case, Chrysler Credit Corporation (Chrysler), appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss or to transfer venue. We affirm.
Appellee/plaintiff, a resident of Taylor County, Florida, purchased an automobile from Tallahassee Chrysler-Plymouth and financed it through the appellant, Chrysler Credit Corporation. Appellee later transferred the car to a third person, from whom it was eventually repossessed.
On July 23, 1985, appellee filed a complaint against Chrysler Credit Corporation and the Credit Bureau of Tallahassee, Inc., in which he alleged that Chrysler reported to the Credit Bureau that it repossessed the car from appellee, and that the Credit Bureau in turn reported this information to other financial institutions, causing damage to appellee’s credit standing in the commu-mty. The complaint was filed in the Third Judicial Circuit, appellee alleging that he was a resident of Taylor County and that the cause of action arose in Taylor County. Ghrysler’s motion to dismiss or to transfer venue was denied, the trial court stating at the hearing that “whether founded in fact or not, the plaintiff did allege that the cause of action occurred in Taylor County.”
We agree with the trial court’s finding and affirm. It is the plaintiffs prerogative to initially select venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute.1 When venue is alleged in the initial pleading by the plaintiff, “it is sufficient if it is laid in the margin even though it is differently and erroneously laid in the body of the pleading.” Trawick, Florida Practice and Procedure, section 5-6 (1986).
Once the plaintiff has selected venue, the burden falls on the party challenging venue to demonstrate by affidavit or sworn pleading that it is improper. Perry Building Systems, Inc. v. Hayes & Bates, Inc., 361 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
See also Eth-Wha, Inc. v. Blankenship, 483 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
Having failed to file an affidavit or sworn pleading, or to present any evidence to establish that the cause of action did not arise in Taylor County, Florida, the defendant in this case has failed to sustain its burden of challenging the plaintiff's venue.
Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of Chrysler’s motion to dismiss or to transfer venue is AFFIRMED.
SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. . The allegations contained in appellee's complaint appear to state a cause of action pursuant to section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes. According to section 559.77:
A debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provisions of this part in the circuit court of the county in which the alleged violator resides or has his principal place of business or in the county wherein the alleged violation occurred.
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Nyberg v. Snover, 604 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…tion does not rise to the level allowing application of the sword-wielder exception. Moreover, it is the plaintiff’s prerogative to make the initial choice of venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Laliberty, 506 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Contrary to the trial court’s construction, there appears to be no authority for the proposition that application of the sword-wielder doctrine is mandatory, so that a plaintiff [*896] must choose the county where the blow h…
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Nyberg v. Doyle Kemp, 616 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…As recognized by this court in Nyberg v. Snover, 604 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992): [I]t is the plaintiff’s prerogative to make the initial choice of venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute. Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Laliberty, 506 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Contrary to the trial court’s construction, there appears to be no authority for the proposition that application of the sword wielder doctrine is mandatory, so that a plaintiff must chose the county where the blow has been,…
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Thomas J. and Marlene Fowler v. Ford Motor Co., 661 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…eged improper venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993), and rules 1.060(b) and 1.140(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the motion to transfer was legally insufficient on its face, we affirm. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Laliberty, 506 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Coggin Pontiac v. Putnam, Auto Sales, Inc., 278 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Our affirmance, however, is without prejudice to the Fowlers’ right to seek transfer of this action under section 47.122, Florida Statutes…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- W. D. Little, Jr., M.D. v. Smeltzer, 361 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Long v. State, 483 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)