NATAL RASUL, A/K/A NATAL ELRASUL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Natal Rasul was convicted of grand theft and sentenced as a habitual offender to ten years, exceeding the statutory maximum of five years. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing after the guidelines scoresheet was recalculated to show a recommended range below the statutory maximum, rendering the habitual offender enhancement issue moot.
The issue became moot after recalculation of the guidelines scoresheet to reflect a recommended range below the statutory maximum. The court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to resentence the defendant pending appeal.
[1] The habitual offender statute cannot be used as a basis for departure from a recommended guidelines sentence nor may it be utilized as an alternative to guideline sentenc…
[2] A habitual offender statute cannot be utilized when the statutory maximum sentence for an offense is less than the recommended guidelines range.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(10) provides that if the composite score for a defendant charged with a single offense indicates a guidelines sentence that exceeds the maximum sentence provided by statute for that offense, the statutory maximum sentence should be imposed.”
Establishes the rule governing situations where guidelines recommendations exceed statutory maximums.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRasul was convicted of grand theft, a third degree felony with a statutory maximum sentence of five years. His initial guidelines scoresheet recommend…
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DANAHY, Chief Judge.
The defendant was convicted of grand theft, a third degree felony. The statutory maximum sentence for that offense is five years. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla.Stat. (1985). The defendant’s guidelines scoresheet indicated a recommended sentencing range of twelve to seventeen years. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(10) provides that if the composite score for a defendant charged with a single offense indicates a guidelines sentence that exceeds the maximum sentence provided by statute for that offense, the statutory maximum sentence should be imposed.
The trial judge declared the defendant a habitual offender under section 775.084 and sentenced him to an enhanced term of ten years imprisonment pursuant to section 775.084(4)(a)(3). The defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in declaring him a habitual offender. Since the sentencing in this case, the supreme court has issued its opinion in Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1986). Therein the court considered the continued viability of the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, in guidelines sentencing cases. The court concluded that the habitual offender statute cannot be used as a basis for departure from a recommended guidelines sentence nor may it be utilized as an alternative to guideline sentencing.
The present case appeared to present a situation which the supreme court did not directly address in Whitehead; that is, a situation in which the maximum sentence for an offense is less than the guidelines recommended range. To declare the defendant a habitual offender in order to enhance his sentence to the extent allowed by section 775.084, but not in excess of the recommended guidelines range, seemed to us to be an application of the habitual offender statute not disapproved in Whitehead. We have considered, then, whether we should affirm the sentence imposed in this case. We were not able to issue our opinion, however, because there was a dispute in this case as to the computation of the defendant’s guidelines scoresheet. We have twice relinquished jurisdiction to the trial judge for the sole purpose of determining the correct scoresheet applicable to this defendant. The trial judge has now provided us with a scoresheet showing a recommended range of two and one-half years to three and one-half years. He has also purported to resentence the defendant to a term of three and one-half years.
While we were attempting to obtain a corrected guidelines scoresheet in this case, the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinions in two cases in which it agreed with our analysis that the decision in Whitehead does not preclude application of the habitual offender statute in a case where the maximum statutory sentence for a defendant’s offense is less than the guidelines recommended range. Winters v. State, 500 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Myers v. State, 499 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). It now appears that the supreme court has considered and rejected the suggestion that the habitual offender act can be utilized in those instances in which the permitted guidelines range exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense charged. Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Re: Sentencing Guidelines (Rules 3.701 & 3.988), 506 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1987) (Grimes, J., specially concurring).
In any event, the issue has become moot in this case by the recalculation of the defendant’s scoresheet to reflect a recommended range below the statutory maximum. Since the trial judge was without jurisdiction to resentence the defendant pending this appeal, we reverse for resentencing.
HALL and SANDERLIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hoefert v. State, 509 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…o our supreme court in Winters v. State, 500 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We have also expressed concern over Whitehead’s application to the limited issue stated above in Patterson v. State, 506 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) and Rasul v. State, 506 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). However, in neither Patterson nor Rasul were we required to address the issue to decide those cases. Now that we are faced squarely with the issue, we have concluded, after considerable study of Whitehead and its progeny and Flor…
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Brown v. State, 639 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…y vested in this court and the trial court, as a result, lacked jurisdiction to correct his sentence. As support, Brown’s motion cites Harrell v. State, 197 So. 2d 505 (Fla.1967); Woods v. State, 516 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); and Rasul v. State, 506 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). We conclude that these cases support Brown’s position and that he may be entitled to relief if the allegations in his motion are true. See also Wolfson v. State, 437 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (once the notice of appeal i…
Authorities Cited
- Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986)
- Myers v. State, 499 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Winters v. State, 500 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Hezekiah v. State, 506 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1987)