MICHAEL S. MICK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Mick appealed consecutive community control sentences imposed for dealing in stolen property and grand theft, arguing that Florida law limited community control to a single two-year period regardless of the number of offenses. The court affirmed, holding that the two-year limitation applies per offense, not as an aggregate cap across multiple offenses.
The court held that Section 948.01(5) does not limit the aggregate duration of community control across multiple offenses. The two-year maximum applies per individual offense, not as an overall cap, allowing consecutive community control sentences to be imposed for different offenses charged in separate informations.
[1] A two-year term of community control is the maximum permissible period for any single offense.
[2] The statutory limitation on the duration of community control to two years applies to each individual offense, not to the total duration of community control imposed for…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Two years is the maximum permissible period of community control for any one offense, Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), but we find nothing in the language of the statute that limits the duration of community control to a total of two years where sentences are imposed for multiple offenses charged in separate informations.”
Establishes the distinction between per-offense and aggregate limitations on community control duration.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMick was charged with five counts of burglary, six counts of grand theft, and one count of dealing in stolen property across five informations. He ple…
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MILLS, Judge.
Mick appeals from sentences imposed following adjudication of guilt for dealing in stolen property and grand theft. He contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive two-year terms of community control. We affirm.
Mick was charged in five informations with a total of five counts of burglary of a dwelling, six counts of grand theft, and one count of dealing in stolen property. He entered into a plea bargain whereby he pleaded nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and guilty to four counts of grand theft, each plea entered to one count in each of the five informations. The State dropped the remaining charges.
The trial court adjudicated Mick guilty on each count pleaded to, and sentenced him to two years community control for dealing in stolen property with the condition that he serve three months in the county jail. The trial court also imposed a two-year term of community control for one of the grand theft offenses, the term to run consecutive to the community control term imposed for dealing in stolen property. Finally, the trial court sentenced Mick to five years probation on each of the three remaining grand thet counts, the terms to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the two terms of community control.
The issue before us is whether Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1985), limits the duration of community control to a single two-year period when the defendant is sentenced at the same sentencing hearing for multiple offenses charged in separate infor-mations. Two years is the maximum permissible period of community control for any one offense, Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), but we find nothing in the language of the statute that limits the duration of community control to a total of two years where sentences are imposed for multiple offenses charged in separate informations. The statute refers to the singular “offense,” not to “offenses.” On the facts of this case, the two-year limitation operates as a cap on the period of community control that may be imposed for each offense, not as a limitation on the total sentence.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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Ogden v. State, 605 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…of community control could be imposed, consecutive terms were only authorized when separate crimes had been committed. See also State v. Arnold, 550 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Sanchez v. State, 538 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Mick v. State, 506 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). However, appellant was convicted of only one offense. We find that the specific statutory limitation on the term of community control governs over the more general provisions for violating penalties after community control. See…
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Sanchez v. State, 538 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…f community control to a single two year period when the defendant is sentenced at the same sentencing hearing for multiple offenses but rather, two years is the maximum permissible period of community control for any one offense. See Mick v. State, 506 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Finally, the defendant contends that the sentence is flawed because it requires him to first serve community control for two years to be followed by three years probation and then be recalled to serve another two year term of c…
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Long v. State, 558 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…without parole for uttering a $100.00 bad check under a South Dakota recidivism statute based on six prior non-violent convictions violated the eighth amend [*1092] ment. In Bloodworth v. State, 504 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and Mick v. State, 506 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the First DCA found that Solem applied only to non-violent felonies. In State v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), approved, 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1990), the court stated: The state also finds Solem an anomalous departure…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)