LLOYD RAPELJE

v.

TYRIK MCCLELLAN.

Judge McKeague dissented. He concluded that "[t]he Michigan Court of Appeals'

*401denial of [respondent's] claims 'for lack of merit [in] the grounds presented' was a merits adjudication" and therefore that "the federal district court was limited to considering the record before the Michigan Court of Appeals at the time that court rendered its decision." 703 F.3d, at 351. He argued that "Michigan courts have 'consistently held that denial of an application "for lack of merit in the grounds presented" is a decision on the merits of the issues raised.' " Id., at 355 (quoting Collier, supra, at *1).

II

As noted, the Sixth Circuit has previously acknowledged that the form of order at issue here represents a disposition "on the merits as a matter of Michigan law." Werth, supra, at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the panel majority in the present case, while purporting to follow that precedent, held that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not adjudicate respondent's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on the merits. That holding cannot be reconciled with Harrington. The Harrington rebuttable presumption comes into play only when a state court's order is ambiguous. When state courts have adopted a phrase to denote a decision on the merits, federal courts may not deem the courts' use of that language to be anything other than an adjudication on the merits. After all, "federal courts have no authority to impose mandatory opinion-writing standards on state courts." Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1095, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013).

Here, petitioner persuasively argues that the form of order used by the Michigan Court of Appeals reflects a merits adjudication under settled Michigan law. For over 30 years, petitioner tells us, that court has "consistently held that denial of an application 'for lack of merit in the grounds presented' is a decision on the merits of the issues raised." Pet. for Cert. 12 (quoting Collier, supra, at *1, in turn citing People v. Hayden, 132 Mich.App. 273, 348 N.W.2d 672 (1984); People v. Douglas, 122 Mich.App. 526, 332 N.W.2d 521 (1983); People v. Wiley, 112 Mich.App. 344, 315 N.W.2d 540 (1981)). See also Attorney General ex rel. Dept. of Treasury v. Great Lakes Real Estate Inv. Trust, 77 Mich.App. 1, 2-4, 257 N.W.2d 248, 249 (1977). There is no dispute that respondent's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were "issues raised" by him before the Michigan Court of Appeals. See 703 F.3d, at 350, n. 4. Accordingly, if this interpretation of Michigan law is correct, it is clear that the court's order was a decision on the merits of those claims.

If that order was on the merits, then the District Court was precluded from holding an evidentiary hearing on respondent's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, see Cullen, 563 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1400-1402, and, in turn, the District Court and Sixth Circuit were not permitted to consider evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in evaluating those claims. Rather, respondent could have prevailed on his claims only if he could have demonstrated an entitlement to relief under § 2254(d) on the state-court record.

In sum, the Sixth Circuit has gone astray in its analysis of habeas cases in which the Michigan Court of Appeals denies review using the form of order at issue here. And this error may derail many Michigan habeas cases. I can understand the Court's reluctance to decide what the form of order at issue means under Michigan law. But I would grant the petition and vacate the decision below because the Sixth Circuit made a severe error of federal law. On remand, I would direct the Sixth Circuit to decide whether, as another panel of that court clearly stated, *402the form of order at issue represents a merits disposition. If so, the Harrington presumption has no place in the court's analysis.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari.